Jury Sentencing and Juveniles: Eighth Amendment Limits and Sixth Amendment Rights by Russell, Sarah French
Boston College Law Review
Volume 56 | Issue 2 Article 4
3-30-2015
Jury Sentencing and Juveniles: Eighth Amendment
Limits and Sixth Amendment Rights
Sarah French Russell
Quinnipiac University School of Law, sarah.russell@quinnipiac.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure
Commons, Judges Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sarah French Russell, Jury Sentencing and Juveniles: Eighth Amendment Limits and Sixth Amendment
Rights, 56 B.C.L. Rev. 553 (2015), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol56/iss2/4
  553 
JURY SENTENCING AND JUVENILES: 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT LIMITS AND SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
SARAH FRENCH RUSSELL* 
Abstract: Across the country, states are grappling with how to comply with 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Miller v. Alabama, which held 
that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth 
Amendment. Following Miller, it appears a sentencer may impose life without 
parole on a juvenile homicide offender only in those rare instances in which 
the sentencer determines, after considering the mitigating qualities of youth, 
that the juvenile’s crime reflects “irreparable corruption.” Courts are preparing 
to conduct resentencing hearings in states nationwide, and new cases where 
juveniles face the possibility of life in prison are entering the courts. Yet 
courts and scholars have not addressed a fundamental question: Who is the 
sentencer? Can a judge decide that a particular juvenile should die in prison or 
does the Constitution give juveniles the right to require that a jury make that 
determination? Courts and state legislatures responding to Miller have as-
sumed that a judge can impose life without parole on a juvenile, as long as the 
judge has discretion to impose a less severe sentence. But viewing Miller in 
light of the Supreme Court’s recent Sixth Amendment jury right jurisprudence 
raises questions about the role of the jury in these post-Miller sentencing hear-
ings. In particular, does an Eighth Amendment limit on a sentence operate in 
the same way as a statutory maximum sentence and set a ceiling that cannot 
be raised absent a jury finding? If so, a jury must find the facts beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that expose a juvenile to life without parole. Understanding 
how the Court’s recent Sixth and Eighth Amendment cases interact has broad 
implications for how sentencing authority is allocated not only in serious ju-
venile cases but also in our justice system more widely.  
INTRODUCTION 
In three recent decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the 
Eighth Amendment places categorical limits on the severity of sentences 
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that may be imposed on individuals whose crimes occurred when they were 
under the age of eighteen.1 First, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 decision 
Roper v. Simmons created an absolute ceiling on punishment for juveniles 
by holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for such 
offenders. 2 In 2010, the Court in Graham v. Florida lowered the maximum 
available penalty for a particular category of juvenile offenders: Those who 
commit nonhomicide offenses may not receive life-without-parole sentenc-
es and must have a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”3 Most recently, in its 2012 deci-
sion Miller v. Alabama, the Court held that even juvenile homicide offend-
ers cannot automatically receive life-without-parole sentences under the 
Eighth Amendment but must have “individualized” sentencing hearings that 
take into account the “mitigating qualities of youth” and the ways in which 
these qualities “counsel against” life-without-parole sentences.4 Miller 
stressed that life without parole should be “uncommon” in juvenile homi-
cide cases and may be imposed only in those “rare” instances in which the 
sentencer determines that the juvenile’s crime reflects “irreparable corrup-
tion.”5 Thus, although Roper places an absolute ceiling on punishment for 
juveniles (i.e., no death penalty for any juvenile), Graham and Miller lower 
the punishment ceiling further for some categories of juveniles.6 
States are now grappling with how to comply with Graham and Miller. 
Sixteen states have enacted legislation responding to these decisions, and 
legislation is being considered in other states.7 State Supreme Courts in Illi-
nois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, South 
Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming have recently held that Miller applies retro-
actively, and inmates are preparing for resentencing hearings.8 With old 
cases being remanded for resentencing hearings and new cases entering the 
system, courts must conduct sentencing proceedings that comply with con-
stitutional requirements. Although much has been written about Graham 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 
(2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005). 
 2 543 U.S. at 572. 
 3 560 U.S. at 75. 
 4 132 S. Ct. at 2467–69.  
 5 Id. at 2469. 
 6 See id.; Graham, 560 U.S. at 75; Roper, 543 U.S. at 572. 
 7 See infra notes 193–249 and accompanying text (discussing state statutes responding to 
Miller and Graham).  
 8 People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 720 (Ill. 2014); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Io-
wa 2013); Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 278 (Mass. 2013); Jones v. 
State, 122 So.3d 698, 703 (Miss. 2013); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014); 
Petition of State, 103 A.3d 227, 233–34 (N.H. 2014); Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572, 575 (S.C. 
2014); Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 
487, 508 (Wyo. 2014). 
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and Miller,9 scholars have not addressed a critical question raised by these 
cases: In states that have retained life without parole as a possible penalty 
for juveniles, who is the sentencer? Can a judge decide that a particular ju-
venile deserves a life-without-parole sentence or does the Constitution give 
juveniles the right to have a jury make that determination? 
Graham and Miller bring to the forefront important questions about 
the allocation of sentencing authority in the justice system. In particular, 
how do Eighth Amendment categorical limits on sentences interact with 
Sixth Amendment jury trial rights?10 Does an Eighth Amendment limit op-
erate in the same manner as a statutory maximum for an offense and thus 
set a ceiling on a sentence that cannot be raised absent a jury finding? 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See, e.g., William W. Berry III, More Different Than Life, Less Different Than Death: The 
Argument for According Life Without Parole Its Own Category of Heightened Review Under the 
Eighth Amendment After Graham v. Florida, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109, 1109 (2010); Cara H. Drinan, 
Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51, 51 (2012); Nancy Gertner, Miller v. Alabama: 
What It Is, What It May Be, and What It Is Not, 78 MO. L. REV. 1041, 1041–44 (2013); Kristin 
Henning, Juvenile Justice After Graham v. Florida: Keeping Due Process, Autonomy, and Pater-
nalism in Balance, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 17, 17–19 (2012); Craig S. Lerner, Sentenced to 
Confusion: Miller v. Alabama and the Coming Wave of Eighth Amendment Cases, 20 GEO. MA-
SON L. REV. 25, 25–27 (2012); Marsha L. Levick & Robert G. Schwartz, Practical Implications of 
Miller and Jackson: Obtaining Relief in Court and Before the Parole Board, 31 LAW & INEQ. 369, 
369–70 (2013); Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 765, 765–67 (2011); Alice Ristroph, Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 23 
FED. SENT’G REP. 75, 75 (2010); Krisztina Schlessel, Graham’s Applicability to Term-of-Years 
Sentences and Mandate to Provide a “Meaningful Opportunity for Release,” 40 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1027, 1028–29 (2013). 
 10 Only a few scholars have considered how the Court’s Eighth Amendment juvenile sentenc-
ing cases might relate to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Beth A. Colgan argues that following 
Miller, if an offense carries a mandatory life-without-parole sentence, age is an element of the 
offense. See Beth A. Colgan, Alleyne v. United States, Age as an Element, and the Retroactivity of 
Miller v. Alabama, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 262, 265 (2013), http://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/
discourse/61-17.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/82EC-4485. In other words, to convict a defend-
ant of such an offense, the jury must find that the defendant is above the age of eighteen. For this 
reason, Colgan asserts that Miller is a substantive rule that must apply retroactively. See id. 
 Richard A. Bierschbach and Stephanos Bibas argue that “commentators have overlooked 
important parallels between the Graham and Apprendi lines.” Richard A. Bierschbach & Stepha-
nos Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment, 112 MICH. L. REV. 397, 399 (2013). They ar-
gue that both lines of cases “marked a departure from the Court’s usual deference to legislative 
judgment with respect to noncapital sentencing decisions,” “limited judges’ powers in some ways 
while enhancing them in others,” and “read constitutional provisions in unexpected ways to real-
locate sentencing power among various actors rather than to limit sentences or sentence enhance-
ments directly and substantively.” Id. Bierschbach and Bibas “see deep connections between these 
seemingly unrelated doctrines.” Id. In their view, “[t]he Court is awkwardly squeezing fundamen-
tal notions about the structural features of a system of just punishment into disparate individual 
rights provisions. What is emerging is a larger structural and procedural framework for constitu-
tionally tailoring punishment.” Id. Unlike Bierschbach and Bibas, I focus on whether Eighth 
Amendment limits trigger Sixth Amendment rights. In particular, I examine whether the Court’s 
recent lines of Sixth and Eighth Amendment cases combine to create a jury sentencing right for 
juveniles facing the possibility of life-without-parole sentences. 
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Under the Court’s recent Sixth Amendment cases, a judge may not 
make factual findings that expose a defendant to a sentence above the max-
imum sentence authorized by the jury’s verdict. “When a judge inflicts pun-
ishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found 
all the facts ‘which the law makes essential to the punishment,’ and the 
judge exceeds his proper authority.”11 In other words, if an enhanced sen-
tence is authorized only if certain facts are established, then a defendant 
may be exposed to the enhanced sentence only if a jury finds those facts.12 
Moreover, the jury must find those facts beyond a reasonable doubt.13 These 
principles apply not only where a maximum sentence is set by statute, but 
also where a presumptive maximum sentence is set by sentencing guide-
lines promulgated by a sentencing commission.14 They also extend to capi-
tal cases: The Sixth Amendment requires that a jury find beyond a reasona-
ble doubt the facts that make a defendant eligible for the death penalty un-
der applicable state statutory provisions.15  
Graham and Miller plainly set limits on the sentences that may be im-
posed in some categories of juvenile cases.16 But do these categorical 
Eighth Amendment holdings trigger Sixth Amendment rights? Can the Con-
stitution set punishment ceilings that cannot be raised absent factual find-
ings made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt? If so, then life without pa-
role may not be imposed on a juvenile unless a jury finds, beyond a reason-
able doubt, that the juvenile’s conduct involved all the factual components 
necessary to make the conduct a “homicide” crime within the meaning of 
Graham.17 Moreover, even in a “homicide” case, a jury would need to find 
                                                                                                                           
 11 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304 (2004) (citation omitted).  
 12 See id. 
 13 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005). 
 14 Id.; see also id. at 232–33. 
 15 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (overruling prior precedent “to the extent that it 
allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for 
imposition of the death penalty” and holding that “[b]ecause Arizona’s enumerated aggravating 
factors operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,’ the Sixth 
Amendment requires that they be found by a jury”) (internal citation omitted). The Court has not 
required that a jury make the ultimate decision to impose death, although several Justices have 
asserted that the Eighth Amendment requires as much. See id.. at 619 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(noting his agreement with Justice Stevens that “the Eighth Amendment requires individual jurors 
to make, and to take responsibility for, a decision to sentence a person to death”). 
 16 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.  
 17 Graham does not define “homicide.” See infra notes 79–85 and accompanying text. Justic-
es Breyer and Sotomayor have asserted that only juveniles who kill or intend to kill may be sen-
tenced to life without parole under Graham. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2476 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(“Graham dictates a clear rule: The only juveniles who may constitutionally be sentenced to life 
without parole are those convicted of homicide offenses who ‘kill or intend to kill.’” (citing Gra-
ham, 560 U.S. at 69)). 
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that a juvenile was irreparably corrupt before life without parole would be 
authorized under Miller.18 
Despite the large volume of litigation involving Miller and Graham,19 
lower courts have not yet addressed the intersection of Miller and Graham 
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jury right cases. Indeed, 
appellate courts remanding cases for resentencing following Miller have 
assumed that judges will be the sentencers.20 Most state legislatures enact-
ing statutes responding to Miller have assumed the same. Although several 
new state statutes do not specify where the sentencing authority lies, most 
states that have retained life without parole for juveniles have placed the 
sentencing authority explicitly in the hands of judges.21 Even without con-
                                                                                                                           
 18 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. In my view, no child is irreparably corrupt and a finding of ir-
reparable corruption at the time of sentencing is not supportable. Yet to the extent Miller appears 
to authorize life without parole for a juvenile if such a finding is made, then a juvenile has a right 
to have a jury finding on the issue. 
 19 In the two years since Miller was decided, the decision has been cited in more than 1000 
cases. 
 20 See infra notes 190–192 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions applying Miller 
and Graham). 
 21 States enacting legislation post-Miller that retains the possibility of life-without-parole 
sentences for juveniles include Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-104 (2014); FLA. 
STAT. § 775.082(1)(b)(1) (2014); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 878.1(A) (2014); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 769.25 (2014); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.02(1) (2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1340.19B (2014); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102.1 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-1 (2014); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (West 2014) (stating those convicted of aggravated murder commit-
ted under 18 shall be sentenced according to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207.7, which provides for 
sentencing by the court); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii). The statutes enacted in Florida, 
Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington place 
the sentencing decision in the hands of judges. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)(b)(1); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 769.25; NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.02(2); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.19B; 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 1102.1(d); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-1; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-202(3)(e), 
76-3-207.7; WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(3)(b). The new statutes enacted in Arkansas and Lou-
isiana are not explicit about whether a jury or judge is empowered to make the sentencing deter-
mination. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-104(b); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 878.1. 
 Several states have eliminated life without parole entirely for juveniles. Colorado, Hawaii, 
and Texas have recently eliminated life without parole for juveniles through legislation that ap-
plies prospectively. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(4)(b)(I) (2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-656 
(West); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.145(b) (West 2014) (eliminating life without parole for 
juveniles 16 and under); TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.31 (West 2014). West Virginia and Wyoming 
have eliminated life without parole for juveniles retroactively. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-23 
(West); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101(b) (2014); State v. Mares, 2014 WY 126 (2014) (holding 
that Wyoming statute applies retroactively). In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court held 
that life without parole for juveniles is prohibited by the state constitution. See Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 1 N.E.3d 259, 264 (Mass. 2013) (life without parole prohibited for juveniles); Diatchenko, 
1 N.E.3d at 278, 285–86 (Mass. 2013) (juveniles currently serving life-without-parole sentences 
entitled to parole). The Massachusetts legislature subsequently enacted legislation that applies 
prospectively.  See infra note 258 and accompanying text.  Delaware and California have created 
mechanisms for juveniles sentenced to life without parole to seek resentencing after serving a 
period of time. Those bills apply retroactively. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i) (West 
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sidering the impact of Eighth Amendment limits on the sentences, some of 
the new statutes impermissibly expose juveniles to enhanced sentences 
based on judicial fact-finding. Moreover, if punishment ceilings created by 
the Eighth Amendment operate in the same manner as maximum sentences 
under statutory or guideline provisions, then many of the statutes enacted in 
response to Miller unconstitutionally permit judges to determine unilaterally 
that life without parole is appropriate for a juvenile. 
Whether an Eighth Amendment punishment ceiling is equivalent to a 
statutory or guideline ceiling for Sixth Amendment purposes impacts not 
only sentencing proceedings in serious juvenile cases, but also a broader 
range of criminal cases. Although the U.S. Supreme Court’s Sixth Amend-
ment decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey and its progeny appear at first 
glance to reinvigorate the jury’s role at sentencing, it is questionable wheth-
er the decisions have, in fact, led to more jury involvement in sentencing 
decisions.22 Legislatures can easily avoid a role for juries in sentencing by 
setting high maximum sentences for offenses and giving judges the discre-
tion to select sentences within statutory ranges.23 Indeed, many of the post-
Miller statutes attempt to do exactly that. The statutes require judges to con-
sider a list of factors, but ultimately give judges full discretion to impose 
life without parole on juveniles convicted of certain offenses—without a 
requirement that any particular factor be found before such a sentence may 
be imposed.24 
Although an Eighth Amendment punishment ceiling is set by the Con-
stitution rather than by a legislature or commission, it nonetheless defines 
the lawful sentencing range to which a defendant may be exposed. Thus, 
under the Court’s recent Sixth Amendment cases, it follows that an Eighth 
Amendment ceiling may not be raised under the Sixth Amendment absent 
jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt. With categorical Eighth Amend-
ment limits triggering Sixth Amendment rights, a role for the jury in sen-
tencing decisions in serious cases is preserved—even if legislatures draft 
                                                                                                                           
Supp. 2015) (providing mechanism for most juveniles serving life without parole to petition court 
for resentencing); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4204A(d)(1) (2014) (providing mechanism for juve-
niles serving life without opportunity for parole and other lengthy sentences to seek resentencing); 
see also S.B. 260, 2013 Legis., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (providing new parole eligibility rules for 
juveniles serving lengthy sentences other than life without parole). The California statute excludes 
some juveniles serving life without parole from petitioning for resentencing. 
 22 See Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, The Facts About Ring v. Arizona and the Jury’s Role in 
Capital Sentencing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 529–30 (2011). For more information, see gener-
ally Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 
(2006); Booker, 543 U.S. at 244; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304; Ring, 536 U.S. at 609; Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 23 See Stephanos Bibas, How Apprendi Affects Institutional Allocations of Power, 87 IOWA L. 
REV. 465, 468 (2002). 
 24 See infra notes 193–249 and accompanying text. 
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statutes in an effort to avoid jury sentencing. Moreover, with Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence creating ceilings on punishment, the facts neces-
sary to raise the ceiling would need to be found by the sentencer beyond a 
reasonable doubt.25 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I examines the Supreme 
Court’s decisions placing Eighth Amendment categorical limits on the sen-
tences that may be imposed on juveniles.26 Part II explores the interaction 
between the Court’s recent Eighth Amendment and Sixth Amendment cases 
and considers whether juveniles have a right to jury findings before life 
without parole may be imposed.27 Part III reveals how state courts and leg-
islatures have assumed that judges rather than juries will sentence juveniles 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Of course, Sixth Amendment jury rights are waivable. See infra notes 284–285 and accom-
panying text. There may be good reasons for juveniles in serious cases to waive the right to jury 
involvement in sentencing and ask judges to determine the sentence. Some commentators have 
stressed that jury sentencing serves as an important check on legislative, prosecutorial, and judi-
cial power. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 (discussing the common law practices that support 
the principle that a criminal defendant has the right to “a jury determination that [he] is guilty of 
every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt”) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305–06 (“Just as suffrage ensures the peo-
ple’s ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their 
control in the judiciary.”); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
72, 83–84 (2011) (noting that at the time of the country’s founding, trial by jury prevented the 
government from ordering its judges to convict its critics); Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the 
Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 33, 106–10 (2003) (discussing the jury’s role in providing a “check against executive and 
legislative overreaching”); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 311, 313 (2003) (arguing that “[i]n the absence of wide consensus on sentencing goals, it is 
best to leave the sentencing decision with a deliberative democratic institution—the jury”). Others 
have warned of dangers of jury involvement in sentencing. Juries may be prone to racial bias and 
arbitrary decision making. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, 41 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1991); Radha Iyengar, Who’s the Fairest in the Land? Analysis of Judge 
and Jury Death Penalty Decisions, 54 J.L. & ECON. 693, 694 (2011); Mona Lynch & Craig 
Haney, Looking Across the Empathic Divide: Racialized Decision Making on the Capital Jury, 
2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 573, 575–86. Some studies have found juries to be harsher sentencers 
than judges. See Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A 
Three-State Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 898–900, 927–28 (2004). See generally Mona Lynch & 
Craig Haney, Emotion, Authority, and Death: (Raced) Negotiations and Mock Capital Jury Delib-
erations, LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (2014). Although studies suggest that juries will tend to find youth 
mitigating, it is difficult to predict whether juries are more inclined than judges to give mitigating 
effect to youth as Miller requires. See infra notes 304–333 and accompanying text. 
 What does seem clear is that the right to jury sentencing would make sentencing in serious 
juvenile cases longer and more complex. Selecting a jury takes time, and the presence of a jury 
may lead to more thorough, capital-style presentations of mitigating evidence by defense lawyers. 
The right to jury involvement thus would give juveniles an important bargaining chip in plea ne-
gotiations: prosecutors may be deterred from seeking life-without-parole sentences because of the 
prospect of lengthy proceedings. All and all, the right to jury sentencing for juveniles in serious 
cases is likely to reduce the prevalence of life-without-parole sentences. 
 26 See infra notes 30–113 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 114–183 and accompanying text. 
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facing life without parole, and considers whether new state statutes re-
sponding to Miller are constitutional.28 Part IV concludes by discussing the 
consequences that may flow from concluding that Eighth Amendment limits 
trigger Sixth Amendment rights and give juveniles the right to jury sentenc-
ing in serious juvenile cases.29 
I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CEILINGS ON PUNISHMENT FOR JUVENILES 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent Eighth Amendment decisions in Roper 
v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama place categorical lim-
its on the sentences that may be imposed on individuals whose crimes oc-
curred before they were eighteen.30 Roper sets an absolute ceiling on punish-
ment by prohibiting the death penalty for juvenile offenders.31 Graham and 
Miller lower the punishment ceiling further for some categories of juvenile 
cases by prohibiting life-without-parole sentences under certain circumstanc-
es.32 These constitutional ceilings on punishment for juveniles are discussed 
below.33 Section A introduces the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence regarding juvenile sentencing.34 Section B then discusses how these 
cases prohibit life-without-parole sentences for juveniles absent certain factu-
al findings.35 
A. Eighth Amendment Limits on Sentencing Juveniles 
In the past ten years, the U.S. Supreme Court has held three times that 
the Eighth Amendment requires individuals under eighteen years of age to 
be sentenced differently from adults.36 In 2005, in Roper v. Simmons, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that it was cruel and unusual punishment under 
the Eighth Amendment to impose the death penalty on an individual who 
was under eighteen at the time of the crime.37 The Court observed that the 
death penalty is reserved for offenders who commit the most serious crimes 
“and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execu-
tion.’”38 The Court reasoned that certain differences between juveniles and 
adults “demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classi-
                                                                                                                           
 28 See infra notes 184–259 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 260–348 and accompanying text. 
 30 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; Graham, 560 U.S. at 75; Roper, 543 U.S. at 572. 
 31 543 U.S. at 572. 
 32 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. 
 33 See infra notes 36–113 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 36–72 and accompanying text.  
 35 See infra notes 73–113 and accompanying text. 
 36 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; Graham, 560 U.S. at 75; Roper, 543 U.S. at 572. 
 37 543 U.S. at 572. 
 38 Id. at 568 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)). 
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fied among the worst offenders.”39 In particular, youth have a “lack of ma-
turity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” they are “more vul-
nerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, includ-
ing peer pressure,” and their character “is not as well formed as that of an 
adult.”40 These differences diminish a juvenile’s culpability and “render 
suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders.”41 
The Court in Roper emphasized that “[t]he reality that juveniles still 
struggle to define their identity means it is less supportable to conclude that 
even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably 
depraved character.”42 Indeed, “[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be mis-
guided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater 
possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.”43 
The Court stressed that “[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to dif-
ferentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate 
yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
irreparable corruption.”44 Accordingly, the Court categorically barred the 
death penalty for juveniles, concluding that “neither retribution nor deter-
rence provides adequate justification for imposing the death penalty on ju-
venile offenders.”45 Following Roper, life without parole thus became the 
harshest available penalty for a juvenile offender.46 
In 2010, in Graham v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits life-without-parole sentences for 
juveniles who commit “nonhomicide” crimes.47 In such cases, states must 
provide juveniles with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”48 In concluding that juveniles 
who commit nonhomicide crimes may not receive life without parole, the 
Court reasoned that “[t]he age of the offender and the nature of the crime 
each bear on the analysis.”49 As it had in Roper, the Court in Graham em-
phasized that juveniles are less culpable than adults due to their underde-
veloped brains and characters.50 Regarding the nature of the crime, the 
Court noted that it had previously recognized that “defendants who do not 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Id. at 569.  
 40 Id. at 569–70 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
 41 Id. at 570.  
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 573. 
 45 Id. at 572–74. 
 46 See id.  
 47 See 560 U.S. at 75.  
 48 See id.  
 49 See id. at 69.  
 50 See id. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. 
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kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less 
deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are murderers.”51 
Relying on these two lines of precedent, the Court concluded that “when 
compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or in-
tend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.”52 In light of this di-
minished capacity and the greater prospects that juveniles have for reform, 
the Court concluded that life-without-parole sentences may not be imposed 
on juveniles in nonhomicide cases.53 
Most recently, in 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Miller v. Ala-
bama that mandatory life-without-parole sentences violate the Eighth 
Amendment when imposed on juvenile offenders.54 Under Miller, even in 
the most serious homicide cases, juvenile offenders are entitled to “individ-
ualized sentencing,” and the sentencer must have discretion to impose a 
sentence that allows a meaningful opportunity for release at a later time.55 
Miller reasoned that “children are constitutionally different from adults for 
purposes of sentencing,”56 and therefore “imposition of a State’s most se-
vere penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not 
children.”57 As in Roper and Graham, the Court in Miller emphasized the 
capacity of children to rehabilitate.58 The Court stated that children have 
“greater prospects for reform”59 than adults, and a mandatory life-without-
parole sentence “disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the 
circumstances most suggest it.”60 Miller does not on its face ban life-
without-parole sentences. Rather, the Court explained: 
We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing 
scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for 
juvenile offenders. By making youth (and all that accompanies it) 
irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a 
scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment. Be-
cause that holding is sufficient to decide these cases, we do not 
consider Jackson’s and Miller’s alternative argument that the 
Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole 
for juveniles, or at least for those 14 and younger. But given all we 
                                                                                                                           
 51 Graham, 560 U.S. at 69. 
 52 Id. at 68–69. 
 53 See id. at 75. 
 54 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
 55 Id. at 2468–69. 
 56 Id. at 2464. 
 57 Id. at 2466. 
 58 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. 
 59 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
 60 Id. at 2468. 
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have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about children’s di-
minished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think 
appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest pos-
sible penalty will be uncommon. That is especially so because of 
the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of distinguish-
ing at this early age between “the juvenile offender whose crime re-
flects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile of-
fender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Although we 
do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that judgment in 
homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are 
different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably 
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.61 
Miller therefore leaves open the possibility of life-without-parole sentences 
for juveniles in “rare” instances.62 In particular, Miller does not “foreclose a 
sentencer’s ability” to make the judgment in a homicide case that a juvenile 
offender’s crime “reflects irreparable corruption.”63 Miller, however, does 
require the sentencer to “take into account” the mitigating qualities of youth 
and how these differences between children and adults “counsel against” 
imposing a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile.64 
Miller flatly prohibits sentencing schemes that mandate life-without-
parole sentences for juveniles upon conviction of the offense.65 Life without 
parole may not be mandatory for juveniles even for the most serious type of 
murder offense in the state—i.e., first-degree murder.66 Instead, the sen-
tencer must have the ability to impose a less severe sentence.67 Moreover, 
merely providing the sentencer with discretion to impose a less severe sen-
tence does not suffice.68 Instead, the sentencer must actually give the quali-
ties of youth mitigating effect and consider how these qualities counsel 
against a life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile.69 The sentencer may 
ultimately make a judgment that a juvenile’s crime reflects irreparable cor-
ruption, but, in the Court’s view, the circumstances where such a judgment 
is appropriate will be uncommon.70 Before making such a determination, 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Id. at 2469 (internal citations omitted). 
 62 See id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id.  
 65 Id. 
 66 See id.  
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
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the sentencer must take into account all the mitigating factors of youth and 
how these factors counsel against such a finding.71 
Accordingly, following Graham and Miller, a life-without-parole sen-
tence can never be imposed on a juvenile who commits a nonhomicide 
crime, and it can be imposed on a juvenile who commits a homicide crime 
only in certain “rare” circumstances where the sentencer concludes that the 
youth is irreparably corrupt.72 
B. The Eighth Amendment and Ceilings on Punishment 
Roper, Graham, and Miller employ categorical Eighth Amendment 
analysis. Rather than considering whether a particular sentence is “grossly 
disproportionate” based on the individual circumstances of the offense and 
the offender,73 these three cases establish Eighth Amendment limits on the 
severity of sentence that may be imposed on particular categories of offend-
ers. Before Graham and Miller, the Supreme Court had not applied categor-
ical bans on sentences of imprisonment under the Eighth Amendment but 
had used categorical limits exclusively with respect to imposition of the 
death penalty.74 In essence, the Court’s categorical Eighth Amendment 
holdings create constitutional ceilings on punishment. Roper imposes an 
absolute ceiling on punishment for juveniles—the case bans the death pen-
alty altogether for all individuals who were under the age of eighteen at the 
time of the crime.75 Graham and Miller create ceilings on punishment for 
some categories of juveniles.76 
1. Ceiling for Juvenile “Nonhomicide” Offenders 
Graham flatly prohibits life-without-parole sentences for juveniles 
who commit “nonhomicide” crimes, and thus creates a ceiling for some ju-
veniles based on the nature of the crime.77 Under Graham, juveniles who 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Id. 
 72 See id.; Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. 
 73 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment) (stating that the Eighth Amendment contains a “narrow proportion-
ality principle,” that “does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence” but ra-
ther “forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime” (quoting 
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 303 (1983))). 
 74 Graham, 560 U.S. at 60 (noting that categorical restrictions were applied previously only in 
death penalty cases); Alison Siegler & Barry Sullivan, “‘Death Is Different’ No Longer”: Graham 
v. Florida and the Future of Eighth Amendment Challenges to Noncapital Sentences, 2010 SUP. 
CT. REV. 327, 336–53 (discussing the evolution of the Court’s Eighth Amendment categorical 
analysis). 
 75 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 572. 
 76 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. 
 77 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. 
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commit nonhomicide crimes may not receive life without parole and instead 
must be given a less severe sentence—i.e., one with a meaningful oppor-
tunity for release.78 
Graham never explicitly defines “nonhomicide” or “homicide.” Justice 
Breyer, joined by Justice Sotomayor, addressed that issue in a concurring 
opinion in Miller.79 The two Justices read Graham to mean that a felony 
murder—where the juvenile did not kill or intend to kill—would not qualify 
as a “homicide.”80 Justice Breyer explained that “if the State continues to 
seek a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for Kuntrell Jack-
son,” who had been convicted only of felony murder, “there will have to be 
a determination whether Jackson ‘kill[ed] or intend[ed] to kill’ the robbery 
victim.”81 In Justice Beyer’s view, “without such a finding, the Eighth 
Amendment as interpreted in Graham forbids sentencing Jackson to such a 
sentence, regardless of whether its application is mandatory or discretionary 
under state law.”82 Justice Breyer noted that “[i]n Graham we said that 
‘when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill 
or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.’”83 According to 
Justice Breyer, “[g]iven Graham’s reasoning, the kinds of homicide that can 
subject a juvenile offender to life without parole must exclude instances 
where the juvenile himself neither kills nor intends to kill the victim.”84 Jus-
tice Breyer concluded that “[t]he upshot is that Jackson, who did not kill the 
clerk, might not have intended to do so either.” In that case, “the Eighth 
Amendment simply forbids imposition of a life term without the possibility 
of parole.”85 If on remand, however, “there is a finding that Jackson did in-
tend to cause the clerk’s death, the question remains open whether the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of life without parole upon a 
juvenile in those circumstances as well.”86 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See id.  
 79 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
 80 See id.  
 81 Id. (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 69). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 69). 
 84 Id. at 2475–76. 
 85 Id. at 2477. 
 86 See id. On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Arkansas Supreme Court remanded 
the case for resentencing to the trial court, stating: “We thus instruct the Mississippi County Cir-
cuit Court to hold a sentencing hearing where Jackson may present Miller evidence for considera-
tion.” Jackson v. Norris, 426 S.W.3d 906, 911 (Ark. 2013). The Arkansas Supreme Court con-
cluded that the discretionary sentencing range for a Class Y felony would apply at the resentenc-
ing (rather than the mandatory life-without- parole sentence provided by statute). See id. at 910. 
For a Class Y felony, the sentence is a discretionary sentencing range of not less than ten years 
and not more than forty years, or life. See id. at 911. 
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As Justice Breyer noted in Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court in Graham 
cited its 1982 death penalty decision in Enmund v. Florida87 and its 1987 
death penalty decision in Tison v. Arizona.88 In Enmund, the Court consid-
ered whether “the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death pen-
alty on one such as Enmund who aids and abets a felony in the course of 
which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, at-
tempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be 
employed.”89 The Court concluded that the death penalty had been improp-
erly imposed on Enmund, who had been the driver for a robbery in which 
his codefendants had killed the robbery victims.90 Five years later, in Tison, 
the Court reaffirmed the holding in Enmund, explaining that something 
more than simple felony murder was required to make a defendant eligible 
for the death penalty.91 Tison qualified Enmund, however, and concluded 
that “major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless 
indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability 
requirement.”92 
In his concurring opinion in Miller, Justice Breyer rejected the view 
that a juvenile’s “reckless indifference to human life” would suffice to ex-
pose a juvenile to life without parole.93 He reasoned: “Indeed, even juve-
niles who meet the Tison standard of ‘reckless disregard’ may not be eligi-
ble for life without parole. Rather, Graham dictates a clear rule: The only 
juveniles who may constitutionally be sentenced to life without parole are 
those convicted of homicide offenses who ‘kill or intend to kill.’”94 Given 
the diminished capacity of juveniles to foresee consequences of their ac-
tions, it is logical that a finding of a youth’s “reckless indifference” should 
not trigger life without parole.95  
Regardless, the Graham Court’s reliance on Enmund and Tison reveals 
that the category of homicide crimes for which life without parole for juve-
                                                                                                                           
 87 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 88 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (Breyer, J., concurring); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 138 
(1987) (citing Edmund, 458 U.S. at 782). 
 89 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 782. 
 90 Id. 
 91 See Tison, 481 U.S. at 158. 
 92 See id. The Model Penal Code does not adopt the felony murder doctrine. Instead, the Code 
requires for a murder conviction a showing of (at least) extreme indifference to human life. The 
Code, however, permits juries to treat participation in an enumerated felony as prima facie evi-
dence of extreme indifference. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 93 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2476 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 94 Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 69). 
 95 See id. Justice Breyer’s formulation appears to permit a juvenile who accidentally kills 
someone during the course of committing a felony to receive life without parole (e.g., if a gun 
misfires during a burglary). A strong case can be made that a juvenile should not be exposed to 
life without parole in a felony murder case (or in any case where death results) absent a finding 
that he had actual intent to kill. 
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niles would be proportional to the offense is at least as narrow—if not more 
so—as the category for which the death penalty would be proportional to 
the offense for adults. 
2. Ceiling for Juvenile Homicide Offenders 
Miller appears to create a further limitation on which juveniles may be 
subject to life-without-parole sentences. Even within the category of juve-
nile “homicide” offenders, the “appropriate occasions for sentencing juve-
niles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”96 Under Miller, a 
life-without-parole sentence may not be imposed on a juvenile offender 
simply because the individual has been convicted of a homicide offense. 
Rather, it appears that life without parole may be imposed only if the sen-
tencer makes the judgment, after taking into account the mitigating circum-
stances of youth, that the juvenile’s crime reflects irreparable corruption.97 
Some courts have read Miller as nothing more than a prohibition of 
mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles. Yet in striking down 
the two mandatory state schemes at issue in the case, Miller imposed re-
quirements on the sentencer when a juvenile is exposed to a life-without-
parole sentence.98 In particular, Miller stated: “we require [the sentencer] to 
take into account how children are different, and how those differences 
counsel against irrevocably sentencing [juveniles] to a lifetime in prison.”99 
One might argue that Miller does not create a ceiling on punishment at 
all, and simply requires the consideration of mitigating factors. Or, one 
could view Miller as operating like many capital sentencing schemes—the 
sentencer must weigh mitigating and aggravating factors before determining 
if a life-without-parole sentence is justified. Miller, however, does not artic-
ulate a weighing approach. Instead, the Court sets a presumption that life-
                                                                                                                           
 96 Id. at 2469. 
 97 See State v. Riley, No. 19109, 2015 WL 854827, at *8 (Conn. Mar. 10, 2015) (holding that 
Miller applies in discretionary sentencing regimes, noting: “in Miller, the court expressed its con-
fidence that, once the sentencing authority considers the mitigating factors of the offender's youth 
and its attendant circumstances, ‘appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest 
possible penalty will be uncommon.’ This language suggests that the mitigating factors of youth 
establish, in effect, a presumption against imposing a life sentence without parole on a juvenile 
offender that must be overcome by evidence of unusual circumstances.”) (internal citation omit-
ted); People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245, 262–63, 270 (Cal. 2014) (rejecting a statutory presump-
tion of life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders and noting that the question for the 
sentencer on remand is “whether each [defendant] can be deemed, at the time of sentencing, to be 
irreparably corrupt, beyond redemption, and thus unfit ever to reenter society, notwithstanding the 
‘diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform’ that ordinarily distinguish juveniles from 
adults”) (internal citation omitted). 
 98 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (majority opinion). 
 99 Id. 
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without-parole is not appropriate for a juvenile.100 The Court states that it 
believes “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest 
possible penalty will be uncommon” because of “the great difficulty we 
noted in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this early age between ‘the 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, 
and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corrup-
tion.’”101 The Court concludes: “Although we do not foreclose a sentencer’s 
ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into 
account how children are different, and how those differences counsel 
against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”102 The “judg-
ment” appears to be the determination that a juvenile is “irreparably cor-
rupt,” and this determination may be made only after taking into account 
the mitigating qualities of youth.103 Thus, only after giving youth mitigating 
effect, and nonetheless finding irreparable corruption, can a sentencer im-
pose a life-without-parole sentence. Of course, a finding of irreparable cor-
ruption would not mandate life without parole, but merely authorize it.104 
Language from several recent state supreme courts supports this read-
ing of Miller. The Connecticut Supreme Court stated that Miller “suggests 
that the mitigating factors of youth establish, in effect, a presumption 
against imposing a life sentence without parole on a juvenile offender that 
must be overcome by evidence of unusual circumstances.”105 As the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court explained, the sentencer “has discretion under Miller 
to decide on an individualized basis” whether the defendant is “a ‘rare juve-
nile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’”106 In remanding 
for resentencing, the California Supreme Court said: “The question is 
whether each [defendant] can be deemed, at the time of sentencing, to be 
irreparably corrupt, beyond redemption, and thus unfit ever to reenter socie-
ty, notwithstanding the ‘diminished culpability and greater prospects for 
reform’ that ordinarily distinguish juveniles from adults.”107 The Nebraska 
Supreme Court explained that Miller “sets forth the general rule that life 
imprisonment without parole should not be imposed upon a juvenile except 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See id. 
 101 Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 573). 
 102 Id. 
 103 See id. 
 104 See id. 
 105 State v. Riley, No. 19109, 2015 WL 854827, at *8 (Conn. Mar. 10, 2015). The Court in 
Riley remanded for resentencing a 100-year sentence, noting that “the record does not clearly 
reflect that the court considered and gave mitigating weight to the defendant’s youth and its hall-
mark features when considering whether to impose the functional equivalent to life imprisonment 
without parole.” Id. at *10. 
 106 Gutierrez, 324 P.3d at 263 (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469). 
 107 Id. at 270 (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464). 
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in the rarest of cases where that juvenile cannot be distinguished from an 
adult based on diminished capacity or culpability.”108 Thus Miller, like 
Graham, appears to create a ceiling. The default rule is that a juvenile hom-
icide offender must have a meaningful opportunity for release. Only those 
judged incapable of rehabilitation may be given a sentence above this ceil-
ing. 
Graham and Miller, however, do not address who can make the sen-
tencing determinations that expose a juvenile to life without parole. If Gra-
ham requires a finding that a juvenile “killed or intended to kill” before life 
without parole may be imposed in a felony murder case, can either a judge 
or a jury make this finding?109 In his Miller concurrence, Justice Breyer 
stated that “[i]f on remand, however, there is a finding that Jackson did in-
tend to cause the clerk’s death,” then Jackson may be subject to life without 
parole.110 Justice Breyer, however, did not address whether Jackson had a 
right to have a jury find that fact. If a jury is not required to consider a de-
fendant’s intent to kill in rendering a guilty verdict, can a judge later find 
this fact—which may well be disputed—at sentencing? Where a jury has 
not found intent to kill, can an appellate court nonetheless review the trial 
and sentencing record, make this finding, and affirm a life-without-parole 
sentence previously imposed on a juvenile? 
The Court’s decision in Miller does not discuss who is empowered to 
make the sentencing decision that the case involves a “rare” instance where 
the juvenile is “irreparably corrupt” and may be sentenced to life without 
parole. Miller generally avoids the issue by referencing the “sentencer” 
throughout the opinion, rather than specifying a judge or a jury.111 The final 
paragraph of Miller suggests that the “sentencer” could be either a judge or 
a jury: “Graham, Roper, and our individualized sentencing decisions make 
clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating 
circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juve-
niles.”112 As discussed below, however, it follows from the Court’s recent 
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in the adult sentencing context that jury 
findings are required before a juvenile may be sentenced to life without pa-
role. Because Sixth Amendment jury rights can be waived,113 Miller’s refer-
ence to the judge as a possible sentencer is hardly dispositive. 
                                                                                                                           
 108 State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 730 (Neb. 2014). 
 109 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 69. 
 110 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2477 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 111 See id. at 2466–69, 2471 (majority opinion) (referring to the “sentencer”).  
 112 Id. at 2475. 
 113 See infra notes 284–286 and accompanying text. 
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II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT, JURY SENTENCING, AND JUVENILES 
The discussion below examines the interaction between the Court’s re-
cent Sixth and Eighth Amendment lines of cases and considers whether a jury 
finding is now required before a juvenile can be sentenced to life in prison 
without the chance of release. Section A examines current Supreme Court 
jurisprudence regarding Sixth Amendment restrictions on criminal sentenc-
ing.114 Section B then considers the categorical limits that the Eighth 
Amendment places on criminal sentencing and how these limits intersect with 
the Sixth Amendment.115 Finally, Section C discusses whether juveniles are 
entitled to jury findings on certain facts before being sentenced to life without 
parole.116 
A. Sixth Amendment Jury Rights and Sentencing 
In a series of cases beginning with the 2000 decision in Apprendi v. 
New Jersey117 the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the Sixth Amendment jury 
trial right for criminal defendants in the sentencing context.118 These cases 
implicate the jury’s role in sentencing juveniles in serious cases post-
Graham and Miller, as well as the standard of proof governing certain fac-
tual findings. 
In Apprendi, the defendant was sentenced under a New Jersey statute 
that increased the maximum term of imprisonment for possession of a fire-
arm for an unlawful purpose from ten years to twenty years if the defendant 
committed the crime with racial bias.119 Following the defendant’s guilty 
plea to the firearm offense, the sentencing judge found racial bias by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence and imposed a sentence of twelve years.120 The 
Supreme Court held that the sentence was unconstitutionally enhanced.121 
The Court reasoned that the due process clause and the Sixth Amendment’s 
jury right, taken together, “indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to ‘a 
jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with 
which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.’”122 The Court concluded: 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See infra notes 117–151 and accompanying text. 
 115 See infra notes 152–166 and accompanying text. 
 116 See infra notes 167–183 and accompanying text. 
 117 530 U.S. 466, 470–71 (2000). 
 118 Id. at 490. For more information regarding this expansion, see generally Alleyne v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2006); Booker v. United 
States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 
U.S. 584 (2002). 
 119 530 U.S. at 470–71. 
 120 Id. at 471. 
 121 Id. at 490–92. 
 122 Id. at 477 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)) (alteration in origi-
nal). The Court relied on In re Winship, which held that a juvenile delinquency finding must be 
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“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty 
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to 
a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”123 Prior to Apprendi, judges 
had routinely imposed sentences above otherwise applicable statutory max-
imums based on judicial fact-finding using a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.124 
After Apprendi, in the 2002 decision Ring v. Arizona,125 the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that it was impermissible under the Sixth Amendment for 
“the trial judge, sitting alone” to determine the presence or absence of ag-
gravating factors that an Arizona statute required to be found before the 
death penalty was authorized.126 Ring did not hold that the Constitution re-
quires juries to make the ultimate determination to impose the death penal-
ty. Rather, the Court held that a defendant cannot be exposed to the possibil-
ity of the death penalty absent a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the factors making him eligible for death are present.127 Following Ring, 
lower courts have generally upheld sentencing schemes that require juries to 
find the aggravating factors that make the defendant eligible for the death 
                                                                                                                           
supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). 
As David Ball observes, the civil character of In re Winship has been largely forgotten by schol-
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 123 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
 124 See id. at 555–60 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the history of judges finding facts 
during sentencing). 
 125 536 U.S. at 588, 609. 
 126 Id. (“Because Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‘the functional equiva-
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ton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 655–56 (1990) (noting that the “Constitution does not require that 
every finding of fact underlying a sentencing decision be made by a jury rather than by a judge”), 
overruled by Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. 
 127 Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. Justice Breyer, concurring in Ring, expressed his view that the 
Eighth Amendment requires the jury to make the ultimate decision to impose the death penalty. 
He explained that “the Eighth Amendment requires individual jurors to make, and to take respon-
sibility for, a decision to sentence a person to death.” Id. at 619 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice 
Breyer relied on Justice Stevens’ views described in prior dissenting and concurring opinions. Id. 
at 614 (citing Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515–26 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); Spaziano 
v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 467–90 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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penalty, and then permit judges to make the ultimate decision to impose 
death.128 
Following Ring, in the 2004 decision Blakely v. Washington, the U.S. 
Supreme Court invalidated on Sixth Amendment grounds the State of Wash-
ington’s sentencing scheme, which permitted judges to impose sentences 
above otherwise standard sentencing guideline ranges based on judicial fact 
finding.129 The defendant’s standard sentencing range under guidelines was 
forty-nine to fifty-three months.130 The Washington scheme, however, al-
lowed for the following: 
A judge may impose a sentence above the standard range if he 
finds “substantial and compelling reasons justifying an excep-
tional sentence.” The Act lists aggravating factors that justify 
such a departure, which it recites to be illustrative rather than ex-
haustive. Nevertheless, “[a] reason offered to justify an excep-
tional sentence can be considered only if it takes into account fac-
tors other than those which are used in computing the standard 
range sentence for the offense.” When a judge imposes an excep-
tional sentence, he must set forth findings of fact and conclusions 
of law supporting it. A reviewing court will reverse the sentence if 
it finds that “under a clearly erroneous standard there is insuffi-
                                                                                                                           
 128 Kamin & Marceau, supra note 22, at 529–30. Indeed, several states including Alabama 
permit a judge to impose death—even after the jury weighs aggravating and mitigating factors and 
recommends life. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, recently stressed that she “har-
bor[ed] deep concerns about whether this practice offends the Sixth and Eighth Amendments.” See 
Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405, 405 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). In Woodward, an Alabama jury voted eight to four against imposing the death 
penalty. Id. “But the trial judge overrode the jury’s decision and sentenced Woodward to death 
after hearing new evidence and finding, contrary to the jury’s prior determination of the same 
question, that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.” Id. 
 A number of lower courts have concluded that the balancing of aggravating and mitigating 
factors under particular state statutory schemes is not a factual finding subject to Ring. See United 
States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1107 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Apprendi/Ring rule should not 
apply here because the jury’s decision that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors 
is not a finding of fact. Instead, it is a ‘highly subjective,’ ‘largely moral judgment’ ‘regarding the 
punishment that a particular person deserves . . . .” (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 
320, 240 n.7 (1985))); State v. McLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d 257, 264 (Mo. 2008) (en banc) (uphold-
ing a judge’s imposition of the death sentence after the jury was deadlocked regarding whether the 
mitigating evidence outweighed aggravating evidence). The Nevada Supreme Court has taken 
another view. See Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450, 460 (Nev. 2002) (concluding that the weighing of 
aggravating and mitigating factors is “in part a factual determination” that must be made by a 
jury). 
 129 542 U.S. at 304–05. 
 130 See id. at 299. 
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cient evidence in the record to support the reasons for imposing 
an exceptional sentence.”131 
In Blakely, the sentencing judge had imposed a ninety-month sentence 
based on its factual finding that the defendant acted with “deliberate cruel-
ty.”132 The Supreme Court rejected the State’s argument that there was no 
Apprendi violation because the relevant “statutory maximum” was the ten-
year maximum provided by statute for class B felonies.133 The Court ex-
plained: “[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maxi-
mum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected 
in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant . . . . In other words, the rel-
evant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may im-
pose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without 
any additional findings.”134 The Court explained further: “When a judge 
inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has 
not found all the facts ‘which the law makes essential to the punishment,’ 
and the judge exceeds his proper authority.”135 
Shortly thereafter, in the 2005 decision Booker v. United States, the 
U.S. Supreme Court used similar reasoning to hold that the federal sentenc-
ing guidelines were unconstitutional to the extent that they required en-
hanced sentences based on judicial fact finding using a preponderance of 
the evidence standard.136 Booker reiterated Blakely’s holding that a defend-
ant’s Sixth Amendment right “is implicated whenever a judge seeks to im-
pose a sentence that is not solely based on ‘facts reflected in the jury verdict 
or admitted by the defendant.’”137 The Court stated that it was reaffirming 
its holding in Apprendi: “Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is 
necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the 
facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by 
the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”138 As a reme-
dy, the Court held that the federal guidelines would be merely advisory, and 
thus the applicable statute would set the maximum sentence.139 
In Cunningham v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Califor-
nia’s determinate sentencing law violated the Sixth Amendment “by placing 
                                                                                                                           
 131 Id. at 299–300 (citations omitted). 
 132 Id. at 300. 
 133 Id. at 303. 
 134 Id. at 303–04. 
 135 Id. at 304 (citation omitted).  
 136 543 U.S. at 243–44. 
 137 Id. at 232 (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303). 
 138 Id. at 244. 
 139 Id. at 245. This remedy eliminated the Sixth Amendment problem, as judges were no 
longer required to increase sentences above otherwise applicable maximum sentences based on 
their factual findings. 
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sentence-elevating factfinding within the judge’s province.”140 Under the 
statute, three possible sentences were possible in Cunningham’s case—six, 
twelve, and sixteen years.141 The sentencing judge could impose an upper 
term only when she found an aggravating factor that was not an element of 
the charged offense.142 Under the determinate sentencing law, an aggravating 
factor, in addition to a few enumerated examples, could be any “additional 
criteria reasonably related to the decision being made.”143 At the sentencing 
hearing, the judge found six aggravating circumstances by a preponderance of 
the evidence and only then increased the sentence to sixteen years.144 The 
Court invalidated the scheme, concluding that “[f]actfinding to elevate a sen-
tence from 12 to 16 years, our decisions make plain, falls within the province 
of the jury employing a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, not the baili-
wick of a judge determining where the preponderance of the evidence 
lies.”145  
Most recently, in the 2013 decision Alleyne v. United States, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that any fact (other than the fact of a prior conviction), 
which triggers a mandatory minimum sentence, must also be found by a 
jury and established beyond a reasonable doubt.146 The Court stressed: 
“When a finding of fact alters the legally prescribed punishment so as to 
aggravate it, the fact necessarily forms a constituent part of a new offense 
and must be submitted to the jury.”147 Accordingly, under the Sixth 
Amendment, a judge may not impose a sentence above the otherwise au-
thorized maximum sentence based on a finding about a disputed factual 
matter (other than the fact of a prior conviction). Booker, Blakely, and Cun-
ningham require that a fact that raises the punishment ceiling—and exposes 
a defendant to the possibility of a higher sentence—must be found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.148 Alleyne, in contrast, focused on the sentenc-
ing floor. A jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that raises 
the sentencing floor (other than the fact of a prior conviction).149 
                                                                                                                           
 140 549 U.S. at 274.  
 141 See id. at 275. 
 142 See id. 
 143 See id. at 280. 
 144 See id. at 275–76. 
 145 Id. at 292. 
 146 133 S. Ct. at 2155. With this holding, the Court overruled Harris v. United States, which 
had held that the Sixth Amendment did not require juries to find facts that trigger mandatory min-
imum sentences. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155. See generally Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 
545 (2002) (allowing a judge to find a fact that triggers a mandatory minimum sentence), over-
ruled by Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155. 
 147 Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2162. 
 148 See Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 292; Booker, 543 U.S. at 244; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304. 
 149 See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155. 
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The “maximum” for Sixth Amendment purposes is the maximum sen-
tence that the law permits based on the facts found by the jury’s verdict or 
admitted by the defendant. Blakely and Booker establish that the maximum 
is not necessarily the maximum provided by statute for the offense, but may 
be lower than the statutory maximum as a result of limits set by sentencing 
guidelines. Indeed, the Court in Booker rejected the Attorney General’s ar-
gument that Apprendi did not apply to the federal sentencing guidelines be-
cause they were promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission 
rather than by Congress.150 The Court found that this argument “lacks con-
stitutional significance” and concluded that “[r]egardless of whether the 
legal basis of the accusation is in a statute or in guidelines promulgated by 
an independent commission, the principles behind the jury trial right are 
equally applicable.”151 
B. Juries and Eighth Amendment Limits 
Blakely and Booker establish that sentencing ranges set by mandatory 
sentencing guidelines implicate Sixth Amendment jury rights.152 But what 
about categorical limits on sentences that are imposed not by statute or by a 
commission, but by courts through Eighth Amendment holdings? Can the 
Eighth Amendment set a maximum sentencing ceiling that implicates the 
Sixth Amendment? 
The U.S. Supreme Court confronted this very question in 1986 in Ca-
bana v. Bullock and determined that Eighth Amendment limits differ from 
statutory provisions for Sixth Amendment purposes.153 Cabana, decided 
four years after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Enmund v. Flor-
ida, held that an Enmund culpability finding need not be found by a jury but 
could instead be found by a judge.154 In rejecting the view that a jury must 
make the Enmund finding before a defendant could be sentenced to death, 
the Court explained that its “ruling in Enmund does not concern the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant—it establishes no new elements of the crime of 
murder that must be found by the jury.”155 Instead, “Enmund holds only that 
the principles of proportionality embodied in the Eighth Amendment bar 
imposition of the death penalty upon a class of persons who may nonethe-
                                                                                                                           
 150 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 237. 
 151 Id. at 237–39; see In re Coley, 283 P.3d 1252, 1282 (Cal. 2012) (“Booker also suggests 
that the applicability of Apprendi’s principle is not limited to legislatively prescribed facts that are 
essential to punishment.”). 
 152 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 243–44; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305. 
 153 474 U.S. 376, 384–86 (1986), abrogated on other grounds, Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 
503 n.7 (1987). 
 154 Id. at 386; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982). 
 155 Cabana, 474 U.S. at 385. 
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less be guilty of the crime of capital murder as defined by state law: that is, 
the class of murderers who did not themselves kill, attempt to kill, or intend 
to kill.”156 According to the Court, the Enmund rule “remains a substantive 
limitation on sentencing, and like other such limits it need not be enforced 
by the jury.”157 
But Cabana was decided before the Court’s expansion of Sixth 
Amendment rights with the Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely line of cases.158 At 
least one commentator has asserted that Cabana should not survive the 
Court’s recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.159 Since Cabana, the Court 
has stressed that whether a factor is labeled a sentencing factor rather than 
an element of the offense is irrelevant for Sixth Amendment purposes. Ra-
ther, the relevant inquiry is whether the law makes a fact essential to pun-
ishment.160 It is no longer accurate to say, as the Court did in Cabana, that 
“a substantive limitation on sentencing” need not be enforced by a jury.161 
Instead, the Court has found that juries must find substantive limits on sen-
tencing set by statutes and guidelines. 
Although several lower courts have held that Cabana survived Ap-
prendi and Ring,162 a few judges have raised questions about the continued 
viability of Cabana.163 Categorical Eighth Amendment limits on sentences, 
                                                                                                                           
 156 Id.  
 157 Id. at 386. 
 158 See infra notes 117–135 and accompanying text. Without extended discussion, the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed Cabana several years before Apprendi in Hopkins v. Reeves. See 524 U.S. 
88, 100 (1998) (“Tison and Enmund do not affect the showing that a State must make at a defend-
ant’s trial for felony murder, so long as their requirement is satisfied at some point thereafter.”). 
 159 See Michael Antonio Brockland, Note, See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: An 
Argument for a Jury Determination of the Enmund/Tison Culpability Factors in Capital Felony 
Murder Cases, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 235, 259–63 (2007). 
 160 See Ring, 536 U.S. at 605 (“[T]he characterization of a fact or circumstance as an ‘ele-
ment’ or a ‘sentencing factor’ is not determinative of the question ‘who decides,’ judge or jury.”). 
 161 See Cabana, 474 U.S. at 386.  
 162 See State v. Galindo, 774 N.W.2d 190, 235 (Neb. 2009); Brown v. State, 67 P.3d 917, 920 
(Okla. Crim. App. 2003). Ring itself involved an Enmund/Tison issue. The judge had found facts 
supporting the Enmund/Tison culpability factors in addition to the statutory aggravating factors 
that exposed the defendant to death. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 594. The Supreme Court concluded that 
the Sixth Amendment required that a jury find the statutory aggravating factors, and thus remand 
was required. See id. at 609. The Court did not address whether Enmund/Tison factors must also 
be found by a jury. On remand, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the Enmund/Tison factors 
could be found by a judge. State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 944 (Ariz. 2003). Following Atkins v. Vir-
ginia, lower courts have rejected the argument that the state must prove to a jury beyond a reason-
able doubt that a defendant is not mentally retarded. See 536 U.S. 304, 320–21 (2002); see, e.g., In 
re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 405 (5th Cir. 2003); State v. Grell, 135 P.3d 696, 702 (Ariz. 2006) (en 
banc). 
 163 Following Ring, a federal district court found that the Sixth Amendment required a jury 
finding on the Enmund/Tison factors. Palmer v. Clarke, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1055 (D. Neb. 
2003). The Eighth Circuit reversed, noting that the jury had in fact found the culpability factors. 
Palmer v. Clarke, 408 F.3d 423, 441 (8th Cir. 2005). Thus, the Eighth Circuit did not reach the 
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such as those set by Enmund, Tison, and Graham, operate no differently 
from statutory maximum sentences from the perspective of the defendant. 
That is, they create definite limits on sentences that may not be exceeded 
absent specific factual findings. Blakely states that if the “judge inflicts pun-
ishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found 
all the facts ‘which the law makes essential to the punishment,’ and the 
judge exceeds his proper authority.”164 The “law” (i.e., the Eighth Amend-
ment) makes certain factual findings “essential” to imposition of certain 
penalties (e.g., the death penalty, life without parole).165 
A difference, of course, is that Eighth Amendment limits are set by the 
Constitution rather than by a legislature. Legislatures define offenses; con-
stitutions do not. Blakely and Booker, however, stress that the maximum 
sentence for Sixth Amendment purposes is what the jury’s verdict alone 
authorizes, without additional findings. As the Court in Booker noted: 
In order to impose the defendants’ sentences under the Guide-
lines, the judges in these cases were required to find an additional 
fact, such as drug quantity, just as the judge found the additional 
fact of serious bodily injury to the victim in [Jones v. United 
States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999)]. As far as the defendants are con-
cerned, they face significantly higher sentences—in Booker’s 
case almost 10 years higher—because a judge found true by a 
preponderance of the evidence a fact that was never submitted to 
the jury. Regardless of whether Congress or a Sentencing Com-
mission concluded that a particular fact must be proved in order 
to sentence a defendant within a particular range, “[t]he Framers 
would not have thought it too much to demand that, before de-
priving a man of [ten] more years of his liberty, the State should 
suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation to 
                                                                                                                           
Sixth Amendment question. See id. Several concurring and dissenting decisions have recently 
discussed the issue. Coley, 283 P.3d at 1282 (Liu, J., concurring) (discussing whether the Eighth 
Amendment can set maximum sentences for Apprendi purposes and noting that “Booker further 
suggests the absence of any bright line limiting Apprendi’s applicability to essential facts estab-
lished by a legislative enactment”); Gongora v. Thaler, 710 F.3d 267, 296 (5th Cir. 2013) (Owen, 
J., dissenting) (stating that “[n]either Ring nor Apprendi—nor any other decision of the Supreme 
Court—has explicitly overruled Cabana’s holding that a trial judge or appellate court may make 
the Eighth Amendment findings mandated by Enmund and Tison” but noting that “[w]hether the 
Supreme Court will continue to adhere to the reasoning and holdings of Enmund, Tison, and Ca-
bana is highly questionable”). 
 164 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 (citation omitted). 
 165 See id. 
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‘the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours,’ 
rather than a lone employee of the State.”166 
In sum, the Eighth Amendment categorically requires that certain facts 
be found before a sentence of death may be imposed on adults or before life 
without parole may be imposed on children. Regardless of whether a statute 
or the Constitution (as interpreted by the Supreme Court) requires that such 
a fact be found, the result is the same for the defendant: he or she faces a 
significantly more severe sentence based on the factual finding. Thus, it 
follows from the Court’s recent Sixth Amendment decisions that categorical 
Eighth Amendment limits trigger Sixth Amendment rights. 
C. Juveniles and Jury Findings 
If categorical Eighth Amendment limits indeed operate in the same 
manner as statutory maximums and trigger Sixth Amendment rights, then 
juveniles have the right to have juries find certain facts beyond a reasonable 
doubt before they can be exposed to life without parole. 
Unquestionably, life without parole is a more severe sentence than a 
life-with-parole sentence for Sixth Amendment purposes. If a statute in-
creased a defendant’s maximum exposure from life with parole to life with-
out parole based on the presence of a particular fact (other than the fact of a 
prior conviction), then that fact would plainly need to be found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.167 
                                                                                                                           
 166 Booker, 543 U.S. at 237–38 (citation omitted). At least three Justices recently endorsed the 
view that holdings by courts can set ceilings on punishment that may not be raised absent a jury 
finding. In dissenting from the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Jones v. United States, 
No. 13-10026 (Oct. 14, 2014) Justice Scalia (joined by Justices Thomas and Ginsburg) stated: 
“We have held that a substantively unreasonable penalty is illegal and must be set aside. It una-
voidably follows that any fact necessary to prevent a sentence from being substantively unreason-
able—thereby exposing the defendant to the longer sentence—is an element that must be either 
admitted by the defendant or found by the jury. It may not be found by the judge.” In Jones, the 
defendants were convicted in federal court of distributing small qualities of drugs but acquitted of 
conspiring to distribute drugs. Yet the sentencing judge found that the defendants had in fact en-
gaged in the charged conspiracy and (relying heavily on that finding), imposed sentences that 
were many times longer than what the federal sentencing guidelines would have otherwise rec-
ommended.  
 167 See State v. Provost, 896 A.2d 55, 65 (Vt. 2005) (“We are persuaded instead by the rea-
soning of courts in other jurisdictions, interpreting similar statutes, that life without parole and life 
with a minimum term of imprisonment are different sentences for Apprendi purposes.”); State v. 
Thomas, 83 P.3d 970, 984 (Wash. 2004) (en banc) (holding that the Sixth Amendment was impli-
cated when aggravating factor raised sentence from life with parole to life without parole because 
“it is clear that the legislature intended a life sentence with the possibility of parole and a sentence 
of life without parole to be wholly different”). 
 Of course, in a state where parole is virtually certain to be denied regardless of a juvenile 
offender’s rehabilitation, there is no meaningful difference between a sentence of life with parole 
and life without parole. Sharon Dolovich observes that “[w]hat in the middle decades of the 20th 
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As discussed, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Graham v. 
Florida categorically prohibits life-without-parole sentences for juveniles 
who commit nonhomicide offenses, and thus creates an Eighth Amendment 
ceiling on punishment for juveniles based on the nature of the offense.168 
Although the Court does not define “nonhomicide,” it is apparent that not 
all cases resulting in the death of a victim can constitutionally expose a ju-
venile to a life-without-parole sentence. Under Justice Breyer’s formulation 
in his concurrence in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Miller v. 
Alabama, a juvenile may not be sentenced to life without parole absent a 
finding that he “killed or intended to kill.”169 Or, if the standard from the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 1987 decision in Tison v. Arizona is used, a juvenile 
may not be sentenced to life without parole in a felony murder case unless 
he had “major participation in the felony committed, combined with reck-
less indifference to human life.”170 
                                                                                                                           
century was a meaningful process in which parole boards seriously considered individual claims 
of rehabilitation has become in most cases a meaningless ritual in which the form is preserved but 
parole is rarely granted.” Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT 
PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 96, 110–11 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat 
eds., 2012). In such states, if the only sentencing options are life with parole or life without parole, 
then the sentencing scheme violates Miller, as, even in a homicide case, the sentencer must have 
the option of imposing a sentence that provides a meaningful opportunity for release. See Sarah 
French Russell, Review for Release: Juvenile Offenders, State Parole Practices, and the Eighth 
Amendment, 89 IND. L.J. 373, 377 (2014). 
 A related question is whether a jury must determine facts that require a parole board to deny 
parole to a juvenile offender because the facts in essence render the sentence parole-ineligible. W. 
David Ball observed that in California, “the parole board can transform parole eligible offenses 
into parole ineligible offenses based on its own findings of fact about the crime, even when these 
findings contradict the jury’s.” W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeter-
minate Sentencing, and the Meaning of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 893 (2009). Alt-
hough Ball views Apprendi as extending to parole release decisions, he rejects “a mechanical 
application of Apprendi,” which would require a jury to find all facts. Id. at 905. In his view, “an 
Apprendized parole board would have no jurisdiction to find any facts.” Id. at 935. Instead, Ball 
argues for “an alternate understanding of Apprendi, one where the jury must find only those facts 
relating to retribution.” Id.  
 168 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010). 
 169 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring). Lower 
courts have generally held that felony murder is a “homicide offense” within the meaning of Gra-
ham. See Arrington v. State, 113 So.3d 20, 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). Commentators have 
asserted that felony murders should fall within Graham’s definition of nonhomicide. See Emily C. 
Keller, Constitutional Sentences for Juveniles Convicted of Felony Murder in the Wake of Roper, 
Graham & J.D.B., 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 297 (2012) (noting that “if a juvenile convicted of 
felony murder did not himself kill or intend to kill, he has the same liability as a juvenile in a non-
homicide felony who did not kill or intend to kill,” and concluding that “[p]ursuant to Graham, he 
is less culpable than a murderer, and life without parole is unconstitutionally disproportionate”). 
Courts have generally held that attempted murder is not a homicide offense under Graham. See 
People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 293 (Cal. 2012); Akins v. State, 104 So.3d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 170 See 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).  
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Whatever the precise definition of “homicide,” in some cases, the ele-
ments of the charged offense will require the jury to make the required cul-
pability findings to convict, and the jury’s verdict alone will establish that 
the juvenile was convicted of a “homicide.” In other instances, however, 
Graham will require an additional factual finding regarding culpability (us-
ing a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof) before a juvenile can be 
exposed to life without parole. 
Moreover, following Miller, a life-without-parole sentence is not au-
tomatically authorized under the Eighth Amendment even in intentional 
murder cases. Rather, it appears such a sentence is authorized only when the 
sentencer makes an additional determination—after taking into account the 
mitigating qualities of youth—that the juvenile offender is irreparably cor-
rupt and incapable of rehabilitation. Thus, under Miller, a jury’s verdict in a 
homicide case will not alone authorize life without parole. Rather, an addi-
tional factual finding is required before life without parole is authorized. 
Accordingly, it appears the combined effect of Graham and Miller is 
that a juvenile is eligible for life without parole under the Eighth Amend-
ment only if there are factual findings that (1) he committed a homicide 
within the meaning of Graham (i.e., he had the requisite culpability level) 
and (2) he is irreparably corrupt.171 Of course, these findings would not 
mandate life without parole. These factual findings, however, appear to be 
prerequisites to exposing a juvenile to a life-without-parole sentence. 
Put another way, if a state adopted a statute that allowed life without 
parole only if the sentencer found that the juvenile intended to kill and was 
irreparably corrupt, then such findings would need to be made by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of a state statute, these findings 
are still required by the Eighth Amendment. Jury involvement—and the 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard—cannot be avoided simply because 
the state legislature has not codified the Eighth Amendment holding. 
Under the Sixth Amendment, if the “judge inflicts punishment that the 
jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts 
‘which the law makes essential to the punishment,’ and the judge exceeds 
his proper authority.”172 The “law” (i.e., the Eighth Amendment) makes cer-
tain factual findings “essential” to the life-without-parole punishment for 
juveniles. Because the law prohibits life-without-parole sentences for juve-
niles absent these factual findings, the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to 
make these findings beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, if a judge im-
                                                                                                                           
 171 See supra note 94–95 and accompanying text (asserting that, under Graham, only those 
juveniles who intended to kill may be sentenced to life without parole); supra note 101 and ac-
companying text (discussing that under Miller a person may be sentenced to life without parole 
only if the juvenile's crime reflects irreparable corruption). 
 172 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304 (internal citation omitted). 
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poses life without parole on a juvenile “sitting alone,”173 then the judge has 
exceeded his authority. 
Thus, juvenile offenders being resentenced following Graham and 
Miller—or being sentenced for the first time—can assert that jury findings 
are constitutionally required before life without parole is imposed. If a jury 
was not instructed to find the Graham culpability factors at trial beyond a 
reasonable doubt (and the juvenile did not make such an admission in a 
plea), then the judge may not later find these facts at a sentencing hearing. 
Moreover, an appellate court reviewing a life-without-parole sentence may 
not determine the presence of the culpability factors based on review of the 
trial and sentencing record.174 Similarly, assuming Miller means a juvenile 
may not be exposed to life without parole absent a determination that he is 
irreparably corrupt, then the juvenile defendant has a right to require a jury 
to make this determination beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It bears noting that lower courts have generally held that a jury need 
not perform the weighing of aggravation and mitigation under state capital 
schemes. As described above, it could be argued that Miller involves a simi-
lar weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Certainly, Miller 
does require an assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors. In par-
ticular, the court must take into account the mitigating qualities of youth in 
assessing the appropriate sentence in cases where the juvenile inflicted seri-
ous harm. Unlike the weighing approach set forth by some state capital 
schemes, however, the consideration of mitigation and aggravation under 
Miller is part of making a particular factual determination: is the juvenile 
irreparably corrupt and incapable of rehabilitation?175 The framework for 
the sentencer set forth by Miller is not unlike the guideline scheme in 
Blakely. In Blakely, the guidelines permitted a sentence above the “standard 
range” only if there were “substantial and compelling reasons justifying an 
exceptional sentence” and supported by factual findings.176 The Supreme 
Court held that facts taking the case outside this standard range must be 
found by a jury. The Court reached a similar result in Cunningham, where 
the statute set a default sentence and permitted a higher sentence only if the 
                                                                                                                           
 173 See Ring, 536 U.S. at 588. 
 174 Cases decided prior to Apprendi permitted Enmund/Tison culpability factors to be found 
by appellate courts based on review of trial records. See Hopkins, 524 U.S. at 100 (“Tison and 
Enmund do not affect the showing that a State must make at a defendant’s trial for felony murder, 
so long as their requirement is satisfied at some point thereafter.”). As discussed, these cases do 
not survive Apprendi and its progeny. In light of the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment cases, 
juries must now find Enmund/Tison factors before an adult defendant may be sentenced to death. 
 175 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. Generally, the purpose of the weighing under the capital 
schemes is to determine whether death is appropriate. 
 176 See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299. 
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judge found facts that justified such a sentence.177 Indeed, Cunningham re-
quired jury fact finding of aggravating circumstances even where the statute 
did not specifically enumerate those factors. Under Miller, in the ordinary 
or standard juvenile homicide case, life without parole is not appropriate.178 
The default is not life without parole. It is only in the rare or unusual case—
where a factual finding of irreparable corruption is made—that a juvenile 
may be exposed to life without parole.179 
It might also be argued that the jury right is not implicated because 
Miller requires the sentencer to consider only mitigating facts and not ag-
gravating facts. Indeed, courts have generally held that facts that mitigate 
punishment under statutory or guideline schemes do not trigger Sixth 
Amendment rights.180 In the 2002 decision Atkins v. Virginia, for example, 
the Supreme Court held that a prisoner with intellectual disability may not 
be sentenced to death under the Eighth Amendment.181 Although this hold-
ing possibly gives a defendant facing the death penalty a right to a jury find-
ing of lack of intellectual disability, courts have generally rejected this view, 
reasoning that intellectual disability is a mitigating factor and that the bur-
den may therefore be placed on defendants to prove it.182 While arguably 
this conclusion is incorrect, even accepting this view of Atkins, Miller is 
distinguishable. Miller concludes that life without parole is an inappropriate 
sentence for most juveniles, and may be given only in rare circumstances 
where certain facts are established. Thus, the factual finding of “irreparable 
corruption” aggravates—not mitigates—the penalty.  
Finally, one might assert that “irreparable corruption” is too amor-
phous a concept to be considered a fact that can be found, and is instead 
simply a moral judgment. Juries, however, are instructed to make findings 
                                                                                                                           
 177 See Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 275. 
 178 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
 179 See id. Post-Blakely, judges continue to have discretion to select a sentence within the 
prescribed sentencing range for the offense of conviction. Judges can make factual determinations 
that influence the sentences they ultimately decide to give. This form of judicial fact finding is 
permitted because the factual determination does not alter the legally prescribed sentencing range 
for the offense of conviction. In contrast, a finding of irreparable corruption does raise the pun-
ishment ceiling for a juvenile. 
 180 See, e.g., United States v. Payton, 405 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Nothing in 
Booker’s holding or reasoning suggests that judicial fact-finding to determine whether a lower 
sentence than the mandatory minimum is warranted implicates a defendant's Sixth Amendment 
rights.”); United States v. Holguin, 436 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the Sixth 
Amendment was not implicated where “the only effect of the judicial fact-finding is either to re-
duce a defendant’s sentencing range or to leave the sentencing range alone, not to increase”). 
 181 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
 182 See James Gerard Eftink, Note, Mental Retardation as a Bar to the Death Penalty: Who 
Bears the Burden of Proof?, 75 MO. L. REV. 537, 553–54 (2010) (“As a general trend, most states 
require the defendant to prove that he or she is mentally retarded in order to be exempt from the 
death penalty.”). 
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of a similar nature under state statutes, such as whether a defendant presents 
a risk of “future dangerousness” or whether a murder was “heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel” or committed with a “depraved heart.”183 Defendants have a 
right to have such facts found by juries.  
This Article does not endorse the view that any child is irreparably cor-
rupt, or that it is possible to determine at the time of sentencing that a child 
will not rehabilitate as he grows older. Miller, however, although recogniz-
ing the difficulty of making such a judgment of irreparable corruption, 
nonetheless appears to leave open the possibility that a sentencer can make 
such a determination. Thus, to the extent that life without parole is author-
ized only upon a determination that a juvenile is irreparably corrupt, then a 
juvenile has the right to insist that a jury make this finding beyond a reason-
able doubt. 
In sum, it follows from the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence that 
juveniles are entitled to jury findings before being sentenced to life without 
parole. Yet, as discussed below, state courts and legislatures responding to 
these cases have, for the most part, assumed that judges rather than juries 
will determine the sentence. 
III. STATE RESPONSES TO GRAHAM AND MILLER AND  
THE ROLE OF THE JURY 
Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Graham v. Flor-
ida and 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama, there has been extensive activi-
ty in courts and state legislatures in response to the decisions. Indeed, in the 
mere two years since Miller was decided, the decision has been cited in 
more than 1000 cases nationwide.184 Numerous state supreme courts have 
issued decisions interpreting Miller, and many more cases are pending.185 
On the legislative front, sixteen state legislatures have enacted statutes in 
response to Graham and Miller, and many others are considering bills.186 
                                                                                                                           
 183 See Ball, supra note 167, at 903 (“During the trial, Apprendi requires the jury to find the 
fact that the crime is so heinous, atrocious, or cruel that the offender does not deserve parole.”); 
Eugenia T. La Fontaine, Note, A Dangerous Preoccupation with Future Danger: Why Expert 
Predictions of Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases Are Unconstitutional, 44 B.C. L. REV. 207, 
208 (2002) (discussing jury determinations of “future dangerousness”). 
 184 See, e.g., Evans-Garcia v. United States, 744 F.3d 235, 236 (1st Cir. 2014); Howell v. 
Hodge, 710 F.3d 381, 393 (6th Cir. 2013); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 505 (Wyo. 2014).  
 185 See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245, 249 (Cal. 2014); People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 
709, 715–16 (Ill. 2014); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 50 (Iowa 2013); State v. Ragland, 836 
N.W.2d 107, 117 (Iowa 2013); Diatchenko v. Dist. Attn’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 278 
(Mass. 2013); Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698, 703 (Miss. 2013); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 
731 (Neb. 2014); Petition of State, 103 A.3d 227, 233–34 (N.H. 2014); Aiken v. Byars, 765 
S.E.2d 572, 575 (S.C. 2014); Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); 
Mares, 335 P.3d at 508. 
 186 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
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Surprisingly, despite all of this activity, there has been essentially no 
debate as to whether a judge or a jury should make the decision regarding 
whether a juvenile receives life without parole. Indeed, for the most part, 
courts and legislatures have assumed that judges will be the sentencers in 
these serious juvenile cases. Section A of this Part discusses how courts 
have responded to Miller and Graham.187 Section B then discusses how 
state legislatures have responded to Miller and Graham.188 Finally, Section C 
discusses the new state statutes that implicate Sixth Amendment concerns.189  
A. Responses by Courts 
Following Graham, lower courts have considered what Graham in-
tended by a “homicide” offense.190 The courts, however, have not addressed 
whether a jury must find the facts qualifying the defendant as a homicide 
offender. Courts have also not yet addressed whether Miller requires a jury 
finding before life without parole may be imposed on a juvenile homicide 
offender. 
Numerous appellate court decisions have remanded cases for resen-
tencing following Miller. Many of these courts have held that life without 
parole will remain an option at resentencing but may be imposed only after 
consideration of the youth-related factors described in Miller. Courts have 
uniformly assumed that a judge will conduct the sentencing proceeding.191 
                                                                                                                           
 187 See infra notes 190–192 and accompanying text. 
 188 See infra notes 193–249 and accompanying text. 
 189 See infra notes 249–258 and accompanying text. 
 190 See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 191 See, e.g., Alejandro v. United States, 13-CV-4364, 2013 WL 4574066, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 22, 2013) (“Although Miller does not prohibit a sentence of life without the possibility of 
parole for a juvenile offender, it mandates that a sentencing judge must be able to at least consider 
mitigating factors when determining whether such a punishment is appropriate.”); Foye v. State, 
CR-12-0308, 2013 WL 5966888, at *9 (Ala. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2013) (“[W]e reverse Foye’s 
sentence and remand this case to the Macon Circuit Court for that court to conduct a new sentenc-
ing hearing at which it shall consider the factors set forth by our Supreme Court in Henderson and 
resentence Foye accordingly.”); Gutierrez, 324 P.3d at 269 (“[W]e hold that the trial court must 
consider all relevant evidence bearing on the ‘distinctive attributes of youth’ discussed in Miller 
and how those attributes ‘diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sen-
tences on juvenile offenders.’” (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012))); Wash-
ington v. State, 103 So.3d 917, 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (“[I]f the state again seeks imposi-
tion of a life sentence without the possibility of parole, the trial court must conduct an individual-
ized examination of mitigating circumstances in considering the fairness of imposing such a sen-
tence.”); Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 723 (Ill. 2014) (“We remand for a new sentencing hearing, where the 
trial court may consider all permissible sentences.”); Null, 836 N.W.2d at 74 (remanding for re-
sentencing, and stating that the sentencing court must recognize that juveniles ordinarily “cannot 
be held to the same standard of culpability as adults in criminal sentencing” and “if a district court 
believes a case presents an exception to this generally applicable rule, the district court should 
make findings discussing why the general rule does not apply”); State v. Fletcher, 112 So.3d 1031, 
1037 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (“We vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand the matter to the trial 
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The only court to reference the jury right issue was the Michigan Supreme 
Court. In concluding that Miller is not retroactive, the court noted: “As none 
of the defendants before this Court asserts that his sentence is deficient be-
cause it was not the product of a jury determination, we find it unnecessary 
to further opine on this issue and leave it to another day to determine 
whether the individualized sentencing procedures required by Miller must 
be performed by a jury in light of Alleyne.”192 
B. Responses by State Legislatures 
Sixteen states have enacted legislation responding to Graham and Mil-
ler. Although some states have eliminated life-without-parole sentences en-
tirely for juveniles,193 the majority of jurisdictions have retained life without 
parole as a possible sentence for juvenile homicide offenders.194 
In considering legislation in response to the Supreme Court decisions, 
lawmakers should be cognizant of Sixth Amendment jury trial issues. Under 
the Sixth Amendment, if a statute requires a specific factual finding before 
life without parole may be imposed, then this fact must be found by a jury 
                                                                                                                           
court for resentencing, after it conducts a more thorough review of the appropriate factors enunci-
ated in Miller. After this review, the trial court will state the reasons for sentencing on the rec-
ord.”); Parker v. State, 119 So.3d 987, 998 (Miss. 2013) (“We agree and vacate Parker’s sentence 
and remand for hearing where the trial court, as the sentencing authority, is required to consider 
the Miller factors before determining sentence.”); State v. Long, 8 N.E.3d 890, 898–99 (Ohio 
2014) (“Although Miller does not require that specific findings be made on the record, it does 
mandate that a trial court consider as mitigating the offender’s youth and its attendant characteris-
tics before imposing a sentence of life without parole.”); Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286, 
296 (Penn. 2013) (“Miller requires only that there be judicial consideration of the appropriate age-
related factors set forth in that decision prior to the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole on a juvenile.”); Sen v. State, 301 P.3d 106 (Wyo. 2013) (“[I]n 
exercising its discretion with regard to a determination as to parole eligibility, the district court 
must set forth specific findings supporting a distinction between ‘the juvenile offender whose 
crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects irreparable corruption.’”); Williams v. Virgin Islands, 59 V.I. 1024, 1042 (2013) (“[I]f the 
court does find this case warrants a sentence of life without parole, it ‘should make findings dis-
cussing why the general rule does not apply . . . [that] go beyond a mere recitation of the nature of 
the crime.’” (citing Null, 836 N.W.2d at 74)). 
 The sole exception is a case from the Missouri Supreme Court, where the defendant had a 
statutory right under Missouri law to jury sentencing. State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 243 (Mo. 
2013) (en banc); see MO. ANN. STAT § 557.036 (West 2014). In remanding for resentencing, the 
court determined that the defendant was not bound by his prior waiver of jury sentencing. Hart, 
404 S.W.3d at 240. The court reasoned: “[E]ven though it is reasonable to assume that Hart 
waived his right to jury sentencing based on which sentencer he thought would be more lenient in 
determining the length of his sentences, it is not reasonable to assume that Hart ever considered 
whether he would prefer the judge or jury to make the new—and qualitatively different—decision 
now required by Miller.” Id. 
 192 People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 829 n.20 (Mich. 2014). 
 193 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 194 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.195 Moreover, as discussed above, 
even if a statute purports to allow a judge to impose life without parole on a 
juvenile without particular factual findings, Graham and Miller appear to 
set an Eighth Amendment ceiling that cannot be raised under the Sixth 
Amendment absent certain factual findings. Yet strikingly, state statutes re-
sponding to Graham and Miller have not required jury findings before life 
without parole may be imposed. Instead, they have either placed the sen-
tencing decision in the hands of judges or have not been explicit about 
where the sentencing authority lies. This Section examines the recently-
enacted state statutes and the sentencing procedures they provide for juve-
niles facing the possibility of life without parole.196 
Post-Miller statutes enacted in states including Florida, Michigan, Ne-
braska, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington 
specifically place the authority to impose life without parole on juveniles 
entirely in the hands of judges, rather than requiring jury involvement. With 
the exception of Utah’s statute, these new statutes all provide a list of fac-
tors for judges to consider when determining whether to impose life without 
parole and require judges to utilize specific sentencing procedures. Califor-
nia enacted a post-Miller statute that retains a judge’s discretion to impose 
life without parole, but allows some juveniles sentenced to life without pa-
role the opportunity to petition for resentencing. Statutes enacted in Arkan-
sas and Louisiana are not explicit about whether a judge or jury has the sen-
tencing authority. Below, Subsection 1 discusses statutes where the judge is 
identified as the sentencer,197 and Subsection 2 discusses statutes where it 
unclear who is the sentencer.198 
1. Statutes Requiring Sentencing by Judges 
Florida enacted a statute retaining life sentences without the opportuni-
ty of release for juveniles in some circumstances.199 In particular, a juvenile 
convicted of capital felony or an offense reclassified as capital felony may 
be sentenced to life imprisonment with no opportunity of release (or sen-
tence review) if he “actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the 
victim” and was previously convicted of certain offenses, or conspiracy to 
commit those offenses.200 The judge must make a written finding as to 
                                                                                                                           
 195 See supra notes 146–149 and accompanying text. 
 196 See infra notes 199–249 and accompanying text. 
 197 See infra notes 199–239 and accompanying text.  
 198 See infra notes 240–249 and accompanying text.  
 199 FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)(b)(1) (2014). 
 200 Id. Prior qualifying convictions include murder, manslaughter, sexual battery, armed bur-
glary, armed robbery, armed carjacking, home-invasion robbery, human trafficking for commer-
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whether “the person actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the 
victim.”201 The judge “may find that multiple defendants killed, intended to 
kill, or attempted to kill the victim.”202 
Judges may decline to impose life sentences in such cases and instead 
impose a sentence of at least forty years.203 In choosing the appropriate sen-
tence, the judge shall consider “factors relevant to the offense and the de-
fendant’s youth and attendant circumstances.”204  
If the judge finds that the juvenile did not actually kill, intend to kill, 
or attempt to kill the victim, then the juvenile may still be sentenced to life, 
but will be eligible for sentence review after fifteen years.205 Juveniles con-
victed of capital felony without prior convictions for the specified offense 
are eligible for sentence review at varying times depending on the sentence 
imposed and whether they killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill.206 
Juveniles convicted of other offenses carrying possible life sentences are 
also eligible for sentence review. The timing of review depends on the na-
ture of the offense and whether the court makes a finding that the juvenile 
actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim.207 
A statute enacted in Michigan permits prosecutors to seek life-without-
parole sentences for defendants convicted of certain offenses. The prosecu-
tor must file a motion within twenty-one days of conviction that specifies 
                                                                                                                           
cial sexual activity with a child under 18 years of age, false imprisonment, or kidnapping. Id. 
§ 921.1402(2)(a). 
 201 Id. § 775.082(1)(b)(3). 
 202 Id. § 775.082(1). 
 203 Id.  
 204 Id. § 921.1401(2). These factors include, but are not limited to:  
(a) The nature and circumstances of the offense committed by the defendant. 
(b) The effect of the crime on the victim’s family and on the community. 
(c) The defendant’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and mental and emotional 
health at the time of the offense. 
(d) The defendant’s background, including his or her family, home, and community 
environment. 
(e) The effect, if any, of immaturity, impetuosity, or failure to appreciate risks and 
consequences on the defendant’s participation in the offense. 
(f) The extent of the defendant’s participation in the offense. 
(g) The effect, if any, of familial pressure or peer pressure on the defendant’s ac-
tions. 
(h) The nature and extent of the defendant’s prior criminal history. 
(i) The effect, if any, of characteristics attributable to the defendant’s youth on the 
defendant’s judgment. 
(j) The possibility of rehabilitating the defendant.” 
Id.  
 205 Id. §§ 775.082(1)(b), 921.1402(2). 
 206 Id. §§ 775.082(1)(b)(1), 921.1402(2). 
 207 Id. §§ 775.082(1)(b), 921.1402(2). The Florida statute applies prospectively only. 
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the grounds on which life without parole is sought.208 If the prosecutor files 
such a motion, “the court shall conduct a hearing on the motion as part of 
the sentencing process.”209 At the hearing, “the trial court shall consider the 
factors listed in Miller v. Alabama . . . and may consider any other criteria 
relevant to its decision, including the individual’s record while incarcer-
ated.”210 At the hearing, “the court shall specify on the record the aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances considered by the court and the court’s 
reasons supporting the sentence imposed.”211 In rendering a decision, “[t]he 
court may consider evidence presented at trial together with any evidence 
presented at the sentencing hearing.”212 If the prosecutor does not seek life 
without parole or the judge decides not to impose life without parole, then 
the judge shall sentence the individual to a term of years with a minimum of 
not less than twenty-five years or more than forty years and a maximum of 
not less than sixty years.213 
Nebraska’s new legislation retains life-without-parole sentences for ju-
veniles but makes such sentences discretionary. In Class 1A felony cases, 
judges may now impose a minimum sentence of forty years, which allows 
parole eligibility after twenty years.214 The statute provides that in deter-
mining whether to impose life without parole, “the court shall consider mit-
igating factors which led to the commission of the offense.”215 In addition, 
“[t]he convicted person may submit mitigating factors to the court.”216 
                                                                                                                           
 208 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.25(1)–(3) (2014). 
 209 Id. § 769.25(6). 
 210 Id.  
 211 Id. § 769.25(7). 
 212 Id.  
 213 Id. § 769.25(9). The Michigan statute applies prospectively only, unless the U.S. Supreme 
Court or Michigan Supreme Court determines that Miller applies retroactively. Id. § 769.25a(2). 
In those instances, juvenile offenders serving life without parole will be resentenced. Id. The 
Michigan Supreme Court recently held that Miller is not retroactive. Carp, 852 N.W.2d at 841. 
 214 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.02(1) (2014); id. § 83-1,110 (2014) (providing that a prisoner is 
eligible for parole after serving fifty percent of the minimum term of his sentence). 
 215 Id. § 28-105.02(2). 
 216 Id. These factors include, but are not limited to: 
(a) The convicted person’s age at the time of the offense; 
(b) The impetuosity of the convicted person; 
(c) The convicted person’s family and community environment; 
(d) The convicted person’s ability to appreciate the risks and consequences of the 
conduct; 
(e) The convicted person’s intellectual capacity; and 
(f) The outcome of a comprehensive mental health evaluation of the convicted per-
son conducted by an adolescent mental health professional licensed in this state. The 
evaluation shall include, but not be limited to, interviews with the convicted per-
son’s family in order to learn about the convicted person’s prenatal history, devel-
opmental history, medical history, substance abuse treatment history, if any, social 
history, and psychological history.” 
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North Carolina’s statute provides that “if the sole basis for conviction 
of a count or each count of first degree murder was the felony murder rule,” 
then a defendant shall be sentenced to life with the possibility of parole af-
ter twenty-five years and may no longer be sentenced to life without pa-
role.217 In other first-degree murder cases, the bill gives discretion to judges 
to impose either life without parole or life with the possibility of parole af-
ter twenty-five years.218 In determining whether to impose life without pa-
role or a lesser sentence, the statute requires that a “hearing . . . shall be 
conducted by the trial judge as soon as practicable after the guilty verdict is 
returned.”219 At the hearing, “[e]vidence, including evidence in rebuttal, 
may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentenc-
ing, and any evidence which the court deems to have probative value may 
be received.”220 The defendant or his counsel may “submit mitigating cir-
cumstances to the court.”221 
Further, “[t]he court shall consider any mitigating factors in determin-
ing whether, based upon all the circumstances of the offense and the partic-
ular circumstances of the defendant, the defendant should be sentenced to 
life imprisonment with parole instead of life imprisonment without pa-
role.”222 Finally, “[t]he order adjudging the sentence shall include findings 
on the absence or presence of any mitigating factors and such other findings 
as the court deems appropriate to include in the order.”223 
Pennsylvania passed a bill eliminating life without parole as a possible 
penalty for juveniles convicted of second-degree murder but retaining life 
without parole as a discretionary option for judges in first-degree murder 
                                                                                                                           
Id. 
 217 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.19A, 15A-1340.19B(a)(1). 
 218 Id. § 15A-1340.19B(a)(2). 
 219 Id. § 15A-1340.19B(b). 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. § 15A-1340.19B(c). These factors include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(1) Age at the time of the offense. 
(2) Immaturity. 
(3) Ability to appreciate the risks and consequences of the conduct. 
(4) Intellectual capacity. 
(5) Prior record. 
(6) Mental health. 
(7) Familial or peer pressure exerted upon the defendant. 
(8) Likelihood that the defendant would benefit from rehabilitation in confinement. 
(9) Any other mitigating factor or circumstance.” 
Id.  
 222 Id. § 15A-1340.19C.  
 223 Id. 
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cases.224 Previously, life without parole was mandatory in all first- and sec-
ond-degree murder cases. The bill states that “[i]n determining whether to 
impose a sentence of life without parole . . . the court shall consider and 
make findings on the record” regarding particular factors.225  
Legislation enacted in South Dakota retains life without parole as a 
sentencing option for judges in first- or second-degree murder cases.226 
Judges in these cases, however, now also have the option of imposing any 
term-of-years sentence. The statute provides that “[s]entences shall be im-
posed without unreasonable delay, but not within forty-eight hours after 
determination of guilt.”227 “Before imposing a sentence, a court may order a 
hearing in mitigation or aggravation of punishment.”228 Additionally, “[i]f 
the defendant is a juvenile convicted as an adult of a Class A or Class B fel-
                                                                                                                           
 224 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102.1 (2014). The Pennsylvania bill establishes a multi-tiered 
system for sentencing youth convicted of first- and second-degree murder. In first-degree murder 
convictions, life without parole remains as a sentencing option for all youth regardless of age. Id. 
§ 1102.1(a). However, as an alternative sentence for first-degree murder, the judge may now im-
pose a sentence with a minimum of thirty-five years to life for youth ages fifteen to seventeen, and 
a minimum of twenty-five years to life for youth under the age of fifteen. Id. In second-degree 
murder cases, where life without parole used to be mandatory, life without parole is no longer an 
option. Id. § 1102.1(c). Instead, youth ages fifteen to seventeen must receive a minimum thirty 
years-to-life sentence, and youth under the age of fifteen must receive a minimum twenty years-
to-life sentence. Id. 
 225 Id. § 1102.1(d). These factors are: 
(1) The impact of the offense on each victim, including oral and written victim im-
pact statements made or submitted by family members of the victim detailing the 
physical, psychological and economic effects of the crime on the victim and the vic-
tim’s family. A victim impact statement may include comment on the sentence of 
the defendant. 
(2) The impact of the offense on the community. 
(3) The threat to the safety of the public or any individual posed by the defendant. 
(4) The nature and circumstances of the offense committed by the defendant. 
(5) The degree of the defendant’s culpability. 
(6) Guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted by the Pennsylvania Com-
mission on Sentencing. 
(7) Age-related characteristics of the defendant, including: 
 (i) Age. 
 (ii) Mental capacity. 
 (iii) Maturity. 
 (iv) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the defendant. 
 (v) The nature and extent of any prior delinquent or criminal history, including 
the success or failure of any previous attempts by the court to rehabilitate the de-
fendant. 
 (vi) Probation or institutional reports. 
 (vii) Other relevant factors.” 
Id. 
 226 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-1 (2014). 
 227 Id. § 23A-27-1. 
 228 Id. 
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ony, prior to imposing a sentence, the court shall conduct a presentence 
hearing.”229 The statute states: 
At such hearing, the court shall allow the defense counsel an op-
portunity to speak on behalf of the defendant and shall address 
the defendant personally and ask him if he wishes to make a 
statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mit-
igation of punishment. The prosecuting attorney shall have an 
equivalent opportunity to speak to the court. The circumstances 
must be presented by the testimony of witnesses examined in 
open court, except that a witness’ deposition may be taken by a 
magistrate in accordance with chapter 23A-12. In imposing a sen-
tence, the court shall enter an order of restitution in accordance 
with chapter 23A-28.230 
Utah’s new statute provides simply that courts can impose in aggravat-
ed first-degree murder cases either life without parole or sentences that al-
low parole after at least twenty-five years.231 The statute provides no special 
factors or procedures for the court to utilize. 
Washington State has also retained life without parole for juveniles in 
certain circumstances.232 Under the statute, juveniles ages sixteen and sven-
teen convicted of aggravated first-degree murder may still be sentenced to 
life without parole.233 Courts in these cases may, however, as an alternative, 
impose life sentences with parole eligibility after twenty-five or more 
years.234 In setting the minimum term for parole eligibility, courts must 
“take into account mitigating factors that account for the diminished culpa-
bility of youth . . . including, but not limited to, the age of the individual, 
the youth’s childhood and life experience, the degree of responsibility the 
youth was capable of exercising, and the youth’s chances of becoming re-
habilitated.”235 Under the bill, individuals convicted of aggravated first-
degree murder committed at age fifteen or younger will be sentenced to life 
with eligibility for parole after twenty-five years.236 
                                                                                                                           
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. 
 231 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207.7 (West 2014). Utah’s new statute provides that aggravated 
murder committed by someone under the age of eighteen is a noncapital first-degree felony pun-
ishable as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207.7. Under that statute, judges may impose life-
without-parole sentences or sentences that allow parole after at least twenty-five years. Id.  
 232 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii) (2014). 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. § 10.95.030(3)(b). 
 236 Id. § 10.95.030(3)(a)(i). The bill applies retroactively and provides for resentencing of 
those currently serving life-without-parole sentences. Id. § 10.95.035. 
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Unlike the states described above, California did not provide mandato-
ry life-without-parole sentences for juveniles prior to Miller. California, 
however, enacted a statute post-Miller impacting juveniles sentenced to life 
without parole. Under the statute, judges continue to have discretion to im-
pose life without parole on juveniles convicted of first-degree murder with 
special circumstances. As an alternative, the court may impose a sentence of 
life with parole after twenty-five years.237 The new statute allows individu-
als sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed under the age of 
eighteen to petition to the court for resentencing after fifteen years if certain 
criteria are met.238 In cases where the defendant is serving life without pa-
role as a result of conviction for first-degree murder with special circum-
stances, the court may resentence the defendant to life with the possibility 
of parole after twenty-five years. The statute, however, does not permit all 
juveniles serving life without parole to petition for resentencing. In particu-
lar, a prisoner may not petition for resentencing if he or she “tortured” the 
victim or if his or her victim was a public safety official, firefighter, or other 
law enforcement officer.239 
2. Statutes Not Specifying the Sentencer 
In contrast to the statutes in California, Florida, Michigan, Nebraska, 
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington, the 
new statutes enacted in Arkansas and Louisiana are not explicit about 
whether a jury or judge is empowered to make the sentencing determina-
tion. The Arkansas statute simply retains life without parole as an option for 
juveniles in some homicide cases but now also permits sentences providing 
parole eligibility after twenty-eight years.240 The bill provides no set of fac-
tors for consideration and no direction about who is empowered to impose 
life without parole. 
Following Miller, Louisiana passed a bill that gives judges the option 
of imposing either life without parole or a sentence allowing parole eligibil-
ity after thirty-five years for first- and second-degree murder cases.241 The 
statute provides that “[i]n any case where an offender is to be sentenced to 
                                                                                                                           
 237 In California, youth ages sixteen and seventeen convicted of murder in the first degree 
with special circumstances may be sentenced to life without parole or life with the chance of pa-
role after twenty-five years, in the discretion of the court. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5(b) (West 
2014). Youth ages fourteen and fifteen convicted of murder in the first degree with special cir-
cumstances may not receive life without parole under California law. 
 238 Id. § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2015). If the court denies the first request for resen-
tencing, the inmate has two more opportunities to seek resentencing. 
 239 Id. § 1170(d)(2)(A)(ii). 
 240 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-104 (2014). 
 241 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.4(D)(1)(a) (2014). 
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life imprisonment for a conviction of” first- or second-degree murder 
“where the offender was under the age of eighteen years at the time of the 
commission of the offense, a hearing shall be conducted prior to sentencing 
to determine whether the sentence shall be imposed with or without parole 
eligibility.”242 “At the hearing, the prosecution and defense shall be allowed 
to introduce any aggravating and mitigating evidence that is relevant to the 
charged offense or the character of the offender, including but not limited to 
the facts and circumstances of the crime, the criminal history of the offend-
er, the offender’s level of family support, social history, and such other fac-
tors as the court may deem relevant.”243 Finally, the statute states that 
“[s]entences imposed without parole eligibility should normally be reserved 
for the worst offenders and the worst cases.”244 
Interestingly, another bill proposed during the same legislative session 
in Louisiana would have explicitly placed the sentencing decision in the 
hands of the jury.245 The bill provided that life without parole could only be 
imposed on a juvenile “upon unanimous determination of the jury.”246 In 
addition, if a jury unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt at least 
one aggravating circumstance,247 “but does not unanimously determine, 
after consideration of mitigating circumstances”248 that a life-without-parole 
                                                                                                                           
 242 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 878.1(A) (2014). 
 243 Id. art. 878.1(B). 
 244 Id. 
 245 H.B. 319, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2013). 
 246 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 906.1(A).  
 247 Id. art. 906.1(B)(1). Aggravating circumstances were defined as: 
(1) The defendant was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of ag-
gravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, or armed robbery. 
(2) The victim was a fireman or peace officer engaged in the performance of his 
lawful duties. 
(3) The defendant knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more 
than one person. 
(4) The defendant has previously been convicted of an unrelated murder, aggravated 
rape, aggravated kidnapping, or armed robbery.  
Id. art. 906.4. 
 248 Id. art. 906.1(B)(1). Mitigating circumstances are defined as: 
(1) The age of the defendant at the time of the offense. 
(2) The defendant’s physical and emotional immaturity. 
(3) The defendant’s diminished intellectual capacity. 
(4) The defendant’s diminished mental development. 
(5) The defendant’s diminished emotional development. 
(6) The defendant’s mental retardation as defined in Article 905.5.1(H) of this Code. 
(7) The defendant did not directly cause or specifically intend to cause the death of 
the victim. 
(8) The defendant’s family background. 
(9) The defendant’s inability to appreciate risks and consequences. 
(10) The defendant was under the influence of another person. 
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sentence should be imposed, then the court shall sentence the defendant to 
life with parole. If the jury failed to find at least one aggravating circum-
stance, then the court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment at hard 
labor for not more than forty years. Under the bill, life without parole could 
be imposed only if the jury unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt 
at least one aggravating circumstance and unanimously determined, after 
consideration of mitigating evidence, that life without parole should be im-
posed.249 
C. Jury Findings and State Statutes 
As discussed, the new statutes in Nebraska, North Carolina, Pennsyl-
vania, South Dakota, and Washington require judges to consider certain fac-
tors and evidence. None of the statutes, however, require that a particular 
factor be established to expose the juvenile to life without parole. Given the 
degree of discretion these statutes grant to the judge in determining the sen-
tence, the statutes standing alone—putting Graham and Miller limits 
aside—do not appear to implicate the Sixth Amendment under the line of 
cases following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey. The statute in Utah provides discretion to the court to impose life 
without parole, without even specifying factors for the court’s considera-
tion. Thus, these statutes standing alone do not appear to implicate Appren-
di. 
Life-without-parole sentences imposed by judges under these schemes 
are, however, subject to Sixth Amendment attack on the ground that Miller 
sets a ceiling that can be raised only if a jury finds that a juvenile is irrepa-
rably corrupt. In addition, statutes in some of these states allow a judge to 
impose life without parole on juveniles for felony murder offenses or other 
offenses that do not require a showing that the defendant killed or intended 
to kill.250 Thus, the statutes permit life without parole even if a jury was not 
required in rendering a guilty verdict for the offense to find that the juvenile 
killed or intended to kill. As described above, such a finding (or some ver-
                                                                                                                           
(11) The defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 
(12) The defendant would benefit from rehabilitation. 
(13) The defendant’s demonstrated maturity since the commission of the offense. 
(14) The defendant’s demonstrated rehabilitation since the commission of the of-
fense. 
(15) Any other relevant mitigating circumstance.  
Id. art. 906.5. 
 249 H.B. 319, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2013). 
 250 For example, Michigan’s statute applies to felony murder offenses, where the defendant 
himself did not kill or intend to kill. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.316, 769.25 (2014). 
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sion of the Enmund/Tison culpability findings) is required to make the 
crime a “homicide” offense within the meaning of Graham.251 
The Florida statute triggers the Sixth Amendment in several ways. 
First, the statute bases the severity of punishment on whether a judge makes 
a factual finding that a juvenile “actually killed, intended to kill, or attempt-
ed to kill the victim.”252 A juvenile convicted of capital felony may not be 
exposed to life without the possibility of sentence review absent that find-
ing. In addition, the timing of sentence review for juveniles convicted of 
other offenses depends on whether the court found that the juvenile “actual-
ly killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim.”253 When a factual 
finding raises the severity of the punishment of an offense under a statute, 
the fact needs to be found by a jury rather than a judge. It would seem that 
the availability and timing of sentencing review—like the availability of 
parole—impacts the severity of the sentence and thus implicates the Sixth 
Amendment. Thus, the Florida statute is unconstitutional to the extent it 
increases the maximum sentence based on a fact found by a judge. In addi-
tion, assuming that Miller creates a punishment ceiling for Sixth Amend-
ment purposes, the Florida statute impermissibly gives judges the authority 
to determine that a juvenile is irreparably corrupt and should receive life 
without parole. 
The Michigan statute also implicates the Sixth Amendment. As the 
Michigan Supreme Court has explained, the new Michigan statute sets a 
“default sentencing range” for those convicted of first-degree murder: the 
maximum may not be less than sixty years and the minimum may not be 
less than twenty-five years or more than forty years.254 Before a juvenile 
may be sentenced to life without parole, the prosecutor must file a motion 
specifying the factual basis for the heightened sentence, and the judge must 
make factual findings regarding aggravating factors. Since these facts “al-
ter[] the legally prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it”255—they must 
be found by a jury.  
                                                                                                                           
 251 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010). 
 252 FLA. STAT. § 1(1)(b)(3) (2014). 
 253 Id. § 775.082(1)(b)(2). 
 254 Carp, 852 N.W.2d at 812. The Michigan Supreme Court explained: 
Rather than imposing fixed sentences of life without parole on all defendants con-
victed of violating MCL 750.316, MCL 769.25 now establishes a default sentencing 
range for individuals who commit first-degree murder before turning 18 years of 
age. Pursuant to the new law, absent a motion by the prosecutor seeking a sentence 
of life without parole, “the court shall sentence the individual to a term of impris-
onment for which the maximum term shall be not less than 60 years and the mini-
mum term shall be not less than 25 years or more than 40 years.” 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 255 See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162 (2013). 
596 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:553 
The California statute raises interesting Sixth Amendment questions. 
The statute gives the sentencing court discretion over whether to impose life 
without parole or life with parole after twenty-five years if a juvenile is 
convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances.256 If a defend-
ant did not torture and did not kill an official victim, then the life-without-
parole sentence provides three opportunities to petition for resentencing 
under a special statutory scheme for juveniles. If the defendant did engage 
in torture or did kill such a victim, however, he or she will have no opportu-
nities to petition for resentencing. To the extent that the denial of an oppor-
tunity to seek resentencing makes the sentence more severe for Sixth 
Amendment purposes, then the defendant has the right to have a jury decide 
whether he engaged in torture or killed an official victim. For a judge to 
make this factual determination—which raises the severity of the sentence 
by depriving a defendant of the right to petition for resentencing—would 
violate the Sixth Amendment. 
The new statutes in Arkansas and Louisiana are silent on the role of the 
jury. Constitutional concerns can be avoided in those states by giving de-
fendants the right to jury involvement. Indeed, Louisiana’s provision that 
life-without-parole sentences “should normally be reserved for the worst 
offenders and the worst cases” triggers the right to a jury finding on whether 
the case and defendant meet this threshold.257 In other words, absent a find-
ing that the case and offender are among the “worst,” life without parole is 
inappropriate under the statute. Thus, in Louisiana, jury sentencing appears 
to be required before life without parole may be imposed, even putting 
aside the fact that Miller and Graham set ceilings on the punishment. 
One other statute warrants mention. In July 2014, Massachusetts 
passed legislation providing that juveniles ages fourteen to seventeen con-
victed of first-degree murder shall be sentenced to life with parole eligibil-
ity set by the court at not less than twenty years and not more than thirty 
years. If the crime is committed with “deliberately premeditated malice 
aforethought,” however, the court shall set parole eligibility at not less than 
twenty-five years and not more than thirty years. If the juvenile commits 
first-degree murder “with extreme atrocity or cruelty,” then the court shall 
fix the parole eligibility date at thirty years.258 
                                                                                                                           
 256 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5(b) (West 2014). California’s Supreme Court recently held that, 
following Miller, sentencing courts may not apply a presumption that life without parole is appro-
priate in first-degree murder cases involving juveniles. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d at 263. Previously, 
some courts had held that such a presumption favoring life without parole applied under the Cali-
fornia statute. See People v. Guinn, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 791, 797 (Ct. App. 1994).  
 257 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 878.1(B) (2014). 
 258 MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 279, § 24 (2014). These parole eligibility rules apply only to 
crimes committed after the effective date of the act. Massachusetts initially eliminated life without 
parole for juveniles through a court decision. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 1 N.E.3d 259, 264 
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Thus, although the Massachusetts statute does not permit life without 
parole, the statute presents Sixth Amendment concerns because it raises the 
mandatory minimum penalty for first-degree murder based on judicial fact-
finding. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne, facts triggering 
higher mandatory minimum sentences must be found by juries—not judg-
es.259 Thus, in Massachusetts, it appears these facts triggering delayed pa-
role eligibility must be found by a jury. 
IV. A ROLE FOR THE JURY IN SENTENCING IN SERIOUS JUVENILE CASES 
As revealed above, state legislatures responding to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama have generally avoided giving 
juries the authority to decide if juveniles should be sentenced to life without 
parole. Most post-Miller statutes explicitly grant judges the authority to 
make this sentencing decision. In addition, by giving judges wide discretion 
over whether to impose life without parole, most of the post-Miller stat-
utes—standing alone—avoid triggering a requirement of jury fact finding 
under the Sixth Amendment. 
Given the ease with which legislatures can draft statutes that avoid 
triggering a role for juries in sentencing, allowing Eighth Amendment limits 
to trigger jury rights may be essential to ensuring some role for the jury at 
sentencing. Section A of this Part discusses the role that juries have played 
in sentencing in the post-Apprendi era.260 Section B then explains how the 
right to a jury trial is a waivable right.261 Section C explores the debate over 
the benefits of having the jury as a sentencer.262 Section D discusses jury 
sentencing in cases involving juveniles.263 Section E considers how giving 
juveniles the right to jury sentencing may result in fewer life-without-parole 
sentences for juveniles.264 Finally, Section F argues that states may avoid 
                                                                                                                           
(Mass. 2013). In December 2013, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that life without 
parole for juveniles violates the state constitution. Id. Under the decision, juvenile offenders con-
victed of first-degree murder and previously sentenced to mandatory life without parole are eligi-
ble for a parole hearing after serving fifteen years. The Court addressed the issue in two decisions 
issued the same day. See Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 278, 285–86 
(Mass. 2013); Brown, 1 N.E.3d at 264. The decisions apply retroactively to inmates currently 
serving sentences. 
 259 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162–63 (2013). It might be argued that the date someone becomes eligi-
ble for parole does not implicate the Sixth Amendment—as long as one is eligible for parole at 
some point in time. It is hard to maintain, however, that a sentence requiring one to wait ten addi-
tional years before becoming eligible for parole is not a more severe sentence triggering Sixth 
Amendment rights. 
 260 See infra notes 266–283 and accompanying text. 
 261 See infra notes 284–286 and accompanying text. 
 262 See infra notes 287–303 and accompanying text. 
 263 See infra notes 304–333 and accompanying text. 
 264 See infra notes 333–338 and accompanying text. 
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Sixth Amendment challenges to life-without-parole sentences by providing 
juveniles with the right to jury sentencing.265  
A. Jury Sentencing After Apprendi 
In colonial America, “juries were de facto sentencers.”266 As Nancy 
Gertner has explained, many crimes were capital offenses, and “the jury’s 
determination of guilt had specific and well-known consequences.”267 If a 
jury determined that capital punishment was not appropriate for the offense, 
it would decline to find guilt or convict for a lesser-included offense to 
avoid imposition of the death penalty.268 As Rachel Barkow has argued, the 
jury’s “power to mitigate or nullify the law in an individual case is no acci-
dent.”269 Rather, “[i]t is part of the constitutional design—and has remained 
part of that design since the Nation’s founding.”270 “Even if the people’s 
representatives agreed that certain behavior should be criminalized, the 
Framing generation wanted the people themselves to have a final say in 
each case.”271 “The purpose of the jury was to inject the common-sense 
views of the community into a criminal proceeding to ensure that an indi-
vidual would not lose her liberty if it would be contrary to the community’s 
sense of fundamental law and equity.”272 
The Court’s recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence is informed by the 
jury’s historical function as a check on government authority. The U.S. Su-
preme Court in 2000 in Apprendi v. New Jersey observed that the “historical 
foundation” for the right to have a jury determine every element of the of-
fense “extends down centuries into the common law.”273 The right serves to 
“‘guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers,’ and 
‘as the great bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties.’”274 In 2004 in 
Blakely v. Washington, the U.S. Supreme Court asserted that the jury trial 
                                                                                                                           
 265 See infra notes 339–348 and accompanying text. 
 266 Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law, 
or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 692 (2010). 
 267 Nancy Gertner, Juries and Originalism: Giving “Intelligible Content” to the Right to a 
Jury Trial, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 935, 937 (2010) (suggesting that in cases involving mandatory mini-
mum sentences or mandatory statutory enhancements, “giving ‘intelligible content’ to the right to 
a jury trial today means, at the very least, telling the jury about punishments, even if they are also 
told that the ultimate sentencing decision is for the judge”). 
 268 Gertner, supra note 266, at 693. 
 269 Barkow, supra note 25, at 36. 
 270 Id.  
 271 Id. at 58. 
 272 Id. at 59; see also Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 
963 (2003); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Implementing Blakely, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 106, 111 (2004). 
 273 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000). 
 274 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES 540–41 (4th ed. 1873)). 
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right “is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of 
power in our constitutional structure. Just as suffrage ensures the people’s 
ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant 
to ensure their control in the judiciary.”275 The Blakely Court emphasized 
that “Apprendi carries out this design by ensuring that the judge’s authority 
to sentence derives wholly from the jury’s verdict” and “[w]ithout that re-
striction, the jury would not exercise the control that the Framers intend-
ed.”276 Yet although Apprendi and its progeny stressed the role that juries 
play in checking legislative, prosecutorial, and judicial power, these Sixth 
Amendment cases have not led to the broad expansion of jury involvement 
in sentencing nationwide that some hoped would occur.277 Moreover, legis-
latures can avoid triggering jury involvement in sentencing by enacting 
statutes that set high maximum sentences for offenses and give judges dis-
cretion to select a sentence within a range.278 
Although juries have become more heavily involved in noncapital sen-
tencing decisions in some states, there has hardly been a jury-sentencing 
revolution nationwide.279 In addition, the Sixth Amendment cases have not 
had a radical impact on jury involvement in death penalty cases. For exam-
ple, in 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Ring v. Arizona that juries 
must find the facts making defendants eligible for the death penalty under 
state statutes. As Sam Kamin and Justin Marceau assert, however, “Ring 
was initially seen, both by its proponents and its detractors, as a sea change 
in the way states could structure their capital decision making; it overturned 
several states’ death penalty statutes and appeared to imperil many 
more.”280 Yet, “eight years after the case was decided, it is not clear what, if 
anything, Ring demands of the states.”281 Indeed, Kamin and Marceau con-
                                                                                                                           
 275 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004). 
 276 Id. at 306. 
 277 See Hoffman, supra note 272, at 954. 
 278 In the federal system, juries have little more involvement in sentencing today than they 
had prior to Booker and Apprendi. Benjamin J. Priester, Apprendi Land Becomes Bizarro World: 
“Policy Nullification” and Other Surreal Doctrines in the New Constitutional Law of Sentencing, 
51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 4 (2011) (“[T]he [Apprendi] doctrine has completely lost touch with 
any basis in jury trial rights, instead focusing entirely on protecting judicial power.”). The U.S. 
Supreme Court in 2005 in United States v. Booker held that the mandatory federal guideline re-
gime triggered Sixth Amendment rights. 543 U.S. 220, 232 (2005). Rather than require juries to 
find facts under the guidelines, however, Booker rendered the guidelines advisory. Id. at 245. 
Thus, judges continue to make factual findings under the guidelines, and jury rights are triggered 
only if a fact alters a statutory sentencing range. These facts requiring jury findings are now simp-
ly pleaded in the indictment and either admitted with a guilty plea or proved at trial. Stephanos 
Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 
801 (2008). 
 279 Id. at 799–802.  
 280 Kamin & Marceau, supra note 22, at 529. 
 281 Id.  
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cluded that “Ring creates perverse incentives” for states that want to avoid 
handing over complete control to juries in capital cases.282 States can re-
move juries “from the equation simply by making capital decision making 
open-ended rather than fact-based, by making the decision to impose death 
a moral judgment rather than a legal conclusion.”283 
Thus, standing alone, the Sixth Amendment does not ensure that de-
fendants have a right to jury involvement in sentencing decisions. Under the 
Court’s current Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, legislatures can avoid jury 
involvement in sentencing decisions in noncapital cases altogether, and can 
give judges the power to make the ultimate decision to sentence a person to 
death. 
If Eighth Amendment limits trigger Sixth Amendment rights, however, 
a role for the jury in sentencing decisions in serious cases can be pre-
served—even if legislatures draft statutes in an effort to avoid giving de-
fendants the right to jury involvement in sentencing. 
B. A Waivable Right to a Jury 
A defendant may consent to judicial fact finding and waive the Sixth 
Amendment right to have a jury find facts.284 The Court in Blakely noted 
that “nothing prevents a defendant from waiving his Apprendi rights. When 
a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial sentence en-
hancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or 
consents to judicial factfinding.”285 In addition, “[e]ven a defendant who 
stands trial may consent to judicial factfinding as to sentence enhance-
ments.”286 
Thus, simply because a juvenile has a right to jury sentencing on the 
question of whether he can be exposed to a life-without-parole sentence 
does not mean that he needs to exercise this right—he could waive the right 
                                                                                                                           
 282 Id. at 530. 
 283 Id. Unlike in noncapital cases, juries must have some role in sentencing decisions in capi-
tal cases as they need to find the facts that make defendants eligible for death. As Kamin and Mar-
ceau explain, with decisions in the 1970s, the Court “essentially mandated that capital sentencing 
include two layers of narrowing: the class of eligible persons must be narrowed to the most severe 
murderers, and there must be a further narrowing such that only the most culpable of those indi-
viduals is sentenced to death.” Id. at 535. States enacted various schemes in response to these 
decisions. As to the first “narrowing,” Ring holds that juries must find the aggravating facts that 
make defendants eligible for death under the statutory schemes. Kamin and Marceau argue, how-
ever, that states can draft statutes that avoid triggering a Sixth Amendment right to jury involve-
ment in the second narrowing decision. Id. at 530. 
 284 See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310.  
 285 Id. 
 286 Id. In response to the dissent, the Blakely majority reasoned: “We do not understand how 
Apprendi can possibly work to the detriment of those who are free, if they think its costs outweigh 
its benefits, to render it inapplicable.” Id. 
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and consent to sentencing by a judge. The judge would still be required to 
find facts beyond a reasonable doubt. As discussed below, in many instanc-
es, there may be good reasons for a juvenile to consent to sentencing by a 
judge. 
C. The Jury as Sentencer 
Courts and scholars have debated the virtues and dangers of jury sen-
tencing. Justices Stevens and Breyer have emphasized the superior ability 
of juries to express moral views of the community. For this reason, the Jus-
tices view the Eighth Amendment as requiring juries to make the ultimate 
decision about whether to impose the death penalty. In his concurring opin-
ion in Ring, Justice Breyer explained his belief that “the Eighth Amendment 
requires individual jurors to make, and to take responsibility for, a decision 
to sentence a person to death.”287 Justice Sotomayor recently observed that 
“[b]ecause ‘capital punishment is an expression of society’s moral outrage 
at particularly offensive conduct,’ jurors, who ‘express the conscience of the 
community on the ultimate question of life or death,’ seem best-positioned 
to decide whether the need for retribution in a particular case mandates im-
position of the death penalty.”288 
Some scholars have highlighted the virtues of jury sentencing. Jenia 
Iontcheva argues that “[b]ecause of their deliberative capacity and demo-
                                                                                                                           
 287 536 U.S. 584, 619 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer relied on Justice Stevens’ 
views described in prior dissenting and concurring opinions. Id. at 614 (citing Harris v. Alabama, 
513 U.S. 504, 515–526 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 467–
490 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). In his Ring concurrence, Jus-
tice Breyer said that he was convinced by Justice Stevens’ reasons for insisting that juries impose 
death sentences, including: “(1) his belief that retribution provides the main justification for capi-
tal punishment, and (2) his assessment of the jury’s comparative advantage in determining, in a 
particular case, whether capital punishment will serve that end.” 536 U.S. at 614. In particular, 
juries are “more attuned to ‘the community’s moral sensibility’” and “‘reflect more accurately the 
composition and experiences of the community as a whole.’” Id. at 615 (quoting Spaziano, 468 
U.S. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Justice Breyer reasoned that 
“[t]he importance of trying to translate a community’s sense of capital punishment’s appropriate-
ness in a particular case is underscored by the continued division of opinion as to whether capital 
punishment is in all circumstances, as currently administered, ‘cruel and unusual.’” Id. at 616. 
Indeed, Justice Breyer noted that many communities do not impose capital sentences at all, and 
this diversity of opinion “argues strongly for procedures that will help assure that, in a particular 
case, the community indeed believes application of the death penalty is appropriate, not ‘cruel,’ 
‘unusual,’ or otherwise unwarranted.” Id. at 618. 
 288 Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405, 407 n.2 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted). In Woodward, an Alabama jury voted eight to four against imposing the death 
penalty. “But the trial judge overrode the jury’s decision and sentenced Woodward to death after 
hearing new evidence and finding, contrary to the jury’s prior determination of the same question, 
that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.” Id. at 405. Justice 
Sotomayor dissented from the denial of certiorari, noting that she “harbor[ed] deep concerns about 
whether this practice offends the Sixth and Eighth Amendments.” Id. Justice Breyer joined. Id. 
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cratic makeup, juries are better situated than other political institutions to 
perform the sensitive tasks of deciding between contested sentencing goals 
and applying the law with due regard for the individual circumstances of 
each offender”289 Richard A. Bierschbach and Stephanos Bibas note that 
“[m]ore than any other actor, juries reflect and embody community values 
at the retail level, giving them special competence to determine what pun-
ishment is appropriate in a given case.”290 In addition, “[t]heir short-term 
service and lay moral intuitions help them to focus on case-specific facets 
of individual blameworthiness.”291 Josh Bowers asserts that “[m]ore than 
the professional, the layperson has the capacity and inclination to cut 
through the thicket of legal and institutional norms (that are not the layper-
son’s stock in trade) to the equitable question of blameworthiness that is and 
ought to be central to the sentencing determination.”292 
But there are also concerns about giving juries the power to sentence. 
Bierschbach and Bibas observe that “juries’ lack of training and experience 
with criminal justice might make them more prone to certain biases and less 
able to situate sentences for particular crimes within the larger sentencing 
framework.”293 Moreover, juries can “be worse at considering systemic fac-
tors such as predictability, equality across cases, and resource allocation.”294 
There are questions about whether juries or judges tend to be harsher 
sentencers. A recent study of death penalty cases concluded that juries are 
more likely than judges to apply the death penalty.295 Nancy King and Ro-
sevelt Noble caution that it “turns out that jury sentencing in practice looks 
very little like jury sentencing in theory.”296 In an empirical study of non-
                                                                                                                           
 289 Iontcheva, supra note 25, at 350. 
 290 Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 10, at 425. 
 291 Id. 
 292 Josh Bowers, Mandatory Life and the Death of Equitable Discretion, in LIFE WITHOUT 
PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY?, supra note 167, at 39. 
 293 Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 10, at 425. 
 294 Id. 
 295 Iyengar, supra note 25, at 694. 
 296 King & Noble, supra note 25, at 888. King and Noble examine jury sentencing in Arkan-
sas, Kentucky, and Virginia and conclude that jury sentencing in those states “bears little resem-
blance to the lofty ideal of a mini-legislature, well-versed in all ‘societal and moral considerations’ 
and dictating ‘acceptable’ punishment policy for the local community.” Id. at 962. They state: 
“Judging from these interviews, any jury sentencing system approaching that ideal would likely be 
rejected as prohibitively expensive and politically unpalatable. Instead, jury sentencing in these 
states, hobbled as it is, plays a vital and pragmatic role within each state’s unique legal and politi-
cal framework: it helps to discourage jury trials and to provide protection from, and for, an elected 
judiciary.” Id.; see also Charles O. Betts, Jury Sentencing, 2 CRIME & DELINQ. 369, 372 (1956) 
(“Many inequalities are displayed by the system which requires or permits the jury to assess pen-
alty in criminal cases.”); Charles W. Webster, Jury Sentencing—Grab-Bag Justice, 14 SW. L.J. 
221, 228–29 (1960); Robert A. Weninger, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: A Case Study of 
El Paso County, Texas, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 24–29 (1994). 
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capital sentencing in Arkansas and Virginia, King and Noble concluded that 
“[f]or most of the offenses examined in these two states, the sentences se-
lected by juries after trial were both more varied and more severe than sen-
tences selected by judges after bench trial.”297 
Some mock studies, however, have found that lay people tend to be 
more lenient than judges in selecting sentences when presented with the 
same information about a case.298 Factors such as whether the judge is 
elected and the proximity of the election to the sentencing decision may 
have a large effect on sentence severity comparisons between judges and 
juries.299 
Of critical significance are the concerns about racial bias influencing 
jury decisions, particularly when juries are given wide discretion or asked to 
make moral judgments.300 Racial bias undisputedly influences capital sen-
tencing decisions.301 In 1987 in McCleskey v. Kemp,302 the U.S. Supreme 
Court considered a study establishing that the death penalty in Georgia was 
imposed more often on black defendants and killers of white victims than 
on white defendants and killers of black victims. Studies in the decades 
since McCleskey find similar evidence that race is a significant factor in 
who gets sentenced to death.303 As discussed further below, racial bias is of 
particular concern in juvenile cases. 
                                                                                                                           
 297 Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Jury Sentencing in Non-Capital Cases: Comparing 
Severity and Variance with Judicial Sentences in Two States, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 331, 
332 (2005); see also Nancy J. King, How Different Is Death? Jury Sentencing in Capital and Non-
Capital Cases Compared, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 195, 200 (2004). 
 298 Shari Seidman Diamond & Loretta J. Stalans, The Myth of Judicial Leniency in Sentenc-
ing, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 73, 74–75, 88 (1989); see also Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries 
by Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 478–79 (2005) 
(finding that juries applied a higher standard than judges in finding guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt); cf. Loretta J. Stalans & Shari Seidman Diamond, Formation and Change in Lay Evalua-
tions of Criminal Sentencing, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 199, 211 (1990) (finding that laypersons’ 
sentences were more lenient than the required minimum sentence). 
 299 Carlos Berdejó & Noam Yuchtman, Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Po-
litical Cycles in Criminal Sentencing, 95 REV. ECON. & STAT. 741, 741 (2013). Berdejo and 
Yuchtman present evidence that “Washington State judges respond to political pressure by sen-
tencing serious crimes more severely.” Id. In particular, “[s]entences are around 10% longer at the 
end of a judge’s political cycle than at the beginning; judges’ discretionary departures above the 
sentencing guidelines range increase by 50% across the electoral cycle, accounting for much of 
the greater severity.” Id. 
 300 Lynch & Haney, supra note 25, at 592–94. 
 301 Iyengar, supra note 25, at 694; Lynch & Haney, supra note 25, at 575–87. 
 302 481 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1987). In a widely criticized decision, McCleskey held that the 
study failed to establish a violation of the equal protection clause. Id. at 297.  
 303 See Lynch & Haney, supra note 25, at 575–87. 
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D. Jury Consideration of Youth 
Whatever the general virtues and dangers of jury involvement in sen-
tencing, there are unique considerations in juvenile cases. If juries are more 
attuned to “the community’s moral sensibility” and “reflect more accurately 
the composition and experiences of the community as a whole,”304 then how 
do communities feel about youth who commit terrible crimes? Will juries 
tasked with sentencing juveniles convicted of serious crimes be naturally 
inclined to give mitigating effect to youth—as they will be instructed to do 
pursuant to Miller—or will judges be better at following this instruction? 
What role does racial bias play?  
Unfortunately, there appear to be no studies examining the factors that 
influence judges in deciding whether to impose life without parole on juve-
niles, or considering how jurors and judges may sentence differently in cas-
es involving serious crimes committed by juveniles.305 Significantly, prior 
to Miller, life without parole in serious cases was mandatory for juveniles in 
many cases, and thus neither judges nor juries were given discretion to de-
termine sentences in these cases.306 
There is surprisingly little data about whether the public views life 
without parole as an appropriate sentence for juveniles.307 One study sur-
veyed Michigan residents in 2005 and 2006 and concluded that support for 
life without parole was low when respondents were presented with different 
(less severe) sentencing options.308 In particular, the researchers found that 
when respondents were “initially given the opportunity to agree or disagree 
with current state policy that requires an adolescent to be sentenced to life 
without any possibility of parole for certain offenses, nearly half (42.6%) 
stated their agreement. Yet, when asked what punishment a youth convicted 
                                                                                                                           
 304 Ring, 536 U.S. at 615 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 481, 486 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 305 Marty Guggenheim and Randy Hertz have considered the problematic aspects of the juve-
nile bench trial model and suggest how legislators and judges can “engraft onto the bench trial 
model some of the safeguards of jury trial.” Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on 
Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 553, 556 (1998). They conclude that judges are more likely than jurors to weigh 
evidence in favor of the prosecution and are less likely to assess the credibility of the accused with 
an open mind, particularly in juvenile court. Id. 
 306 At the time Miller v. Alabama was decided, twenty-nine jurisdictions (twenty-eight states 
and the federal government) imposed mandatory life-without-parole sentences on some juveniles 
convicted of murder in adult court. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012). 
 307 Some older studies assessed whether there was public support for life without parole for 
juveniles as an alternative to the death penalty. See Brenda L. Vogel & Ronald E. Vogel, The Age 
of Death: Appraising Public Opinion of Juvenile Capital Punishment, 31 J. CRIM. JUST. 169, 173–
81 (2003). 
 308 Sheryl Pimlott Kubiak & Terrence Allen, Public Opinion Regarding Juvenile Life Without 
Parole in Consecutive Statewide Surveys, 57 CRIME & DELINQ. 495, 498–511 (2011). 
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of homicide should receive—and provided with six options—only 5% 
choose [life without parole] in an adult prison, the current state policy.”309 
Indeed, when given more information, “only 8.5% of those who initially 
agreed with the current policy chose the sanction associated with that poli-
cy.”310 
Our knowledge about juries and juveniles is limited because juveniles 
facing charges in juvenile court have no Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial.311 Nevertheless, some states provide jury trials to at least some catego-
                                                                                                                           
 309 Id. at 509. 
 310 Id. A 2013 study considered to what extent the public views life without parole as appro-
priate for juvenile offenders and how a person’s punishment-related ideologies were associated 
with support for life without parole. Edie Greene & Andrew J. Evelo, Attitudes Regarding Life 
Sentences for Juvenile Offenders, 37 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 276, 278–87 (2013). The study found 
that that “[w]hen respondents were asked about the minimum age at which [life without parole] 
was appropriate for offenders who committed murder, only a slight majority selected an age that 
was less than eighteen years, as did only approximately one quarter of respondents when asked 
about sentencing juveniles who committed nonhomicide offenses.” Id. at 286. Among the subset 
who endorsed life without parole for at least some offenders (and for all crimes except murder of 
an abusive parent), however, the majority gave a minimum age for life-without-parole sentences 
in the juvenile range. Id. at 287. Furthermore, among those respondents who favored life without 
parole for juvenile offenders “a higher proportion of respondents gave a minimum age for life 
without parole in the 10–15-year-old range than indicated the minimum age should be in the 16–
17-year-old range.” Id. The authors concluded that their studies “show (a) that, as a consequence 
of the serious nature of their crimes, a subgroup of juvenile offenders is judged worthy of very 
harsh punishment, and (b) that a subset of the public—those who doubt that these youthful offend-
ers can successfully reform and be reintegrated into society—deems them so.” Id. 
 311 In 1967 in In re Gault, the U.S. Supreme Court extended many procedural protections to 
juvenile adjudications, concluding that juveniles who face the possibility of incarceration if found 
to be delinquent are entitled to notice of the charges, assistance of counsel, rights of confrontation 
and cross-examination, and the protections of the privilege against self-incrimination. 387 U.S. 1, 
31–57 (1967). Several years later, in In re Winship, the U.S. Supreme Court held that juveniles 
charged in delinquency proceedings with acts that would be crimes if committed by adults are 
entitled as a matter of due process to the reasonable doubt standard of proof. 397 U.S. 358, 368 
(1970). In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, however, a plurality of the Court refused to extend the jury 
trial to juveniles in delinquency proceedings. 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion). The 
plurality reasoned that juries are not necessary to achieve accuracy—unlike the protections recog-
nized in Gault and Winship. Id. at 543. The Court also observed: “If the jury trial were to be in-
jected into the juvenile court system as a matter of right, it would bring with it into that system the 
traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly, the public 
trial.” Id. at 550. With these consequences, there would be “little need for [the] separate existence” 
of juvenile courts. Id. at 551. For discussion of McKeiver and jury trial rights for juveniles, see 
generally Susan E. Brooks, Juvenile Injustice: The Ban on Jury Trials for Juveniles in the District 
of Columbia, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 875 (1995) (arguing against the rationale put forth in 
McKeiver); Joseph B. Sanborn Jr., The Right to a Public Jury Trial: A Need for Today’s Juvenile 
Court, 76 JUDICATURE 230 (1993) (arguing that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial should 
be extended to juvenile courts). Recently, the Kansas Supreme Court found that the Sixth 
Amendment right attaches to some juvenile prosecutions in juvenile court given the punitive na-
ture of these proceedings. In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 170 (Kan. 2008). For a discussion of Sixth 
Amendment rights in juvenile delinquency proceedings, see generally Martin R. Gardner, Punitive 
Juvenile Justice and Public Trials by Jury: Sixth Amendment Applications in a Post-McKeiver 
World, 91 NEB. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
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ries of juveniles in delinquency proceedings as a matter of state law.312 
Moreover, community involvement in adjudicating matters involving juve-
niles has increased in recent years with the advent of juvenile review boards 
and youth courts.313 And, of course, juries try juveniles transferred to adult 
court. 
Although the literature is not extensive, several studies are instructive 
as we consider how jurors are likely to behave as sentencers in serious cases 
involving juveniles. Perhaps most analogous to a jury considering whether 
to sentence a juvenile to life in prison without parole is the experience of 
juries in considering whether to impose the death penalty on juvenile of-
fenders prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Roper v. Sim-
mons. 
In the years leading up to Roper, there had been a decline in the use of 
the death penalty for juvenile homicide offenders. An empirical study pub-
lished in 2005 found that “[t]here is compelling evidence, even in the states 
that theoretically permit the use of the juvenile death penalty, of an emerg-
ing societal norm opposing the death penalty for juvenile offenders—which 
has in the last several years reduced the number of juveniles sentenced to 
death almost to zero.”314 
A 2004 study about jury decision making in juvenile death penalty 
cases considered why juries were less likely to impose the death penalty on 
                                                                                                                           
 312 See Linda A. Szymanski, Juvenile Delinquents’ Right to a Jury Trial (2007 Update), 
NAT’L CTR. JUV. JUST. 13(2) (Feb. 2008), available at http://www.ncjj.org/PDF/Snapshots/2008/
Vol13_no2_righttojurytrial.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LC6Q-NU85 (stating that thirty states 
plus the District of Columbia have statutory or case law that denies juveniles the right to a jury 
trial, while the remaining states either allow for it by right for delinquency adjudications or pro-
vide jury trials for juveniles under limited circumstances); Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory 
of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1447, 1451 n.20 (2009) (finding that twenty 
states provide jury trials to juveniles by right or allow them under limited circumstances). 
 313 See Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Col-
or: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 456–59 (2013) 
(discussing youth courts and diversionary programs for youth). 
 314 Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, The Decline of the Juvenile Death Penalty: Scientific Evi-
dence of Evolving Norms, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 427, 495 (2005). The study analyzed 
data regarding the use of the death penalty for adolescent homicide offenders in the United States 
since 1990. The number of juveniles peaked (at fifteen) in 1994, had a more recent peak (at four-
teen) in 1999, and declined to one in 2003. Id. at 456. The authors concluded:  
The decline in the number of juveniles sentenced to death since Stanford has been 
greater than the parallel decline for adults ages eighteen to twenty-four and for 
adults twenty-five and over, suggesting an age-specific decline. The decline in juve-
niles sentenced to death is striking, and is greater than the analogous decline for 
adults, even after the sentencing rate is indexed to the declining homicide rate and to 
the declining homicide arrest rate. 
Id. at 494. 
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juveniles.315 The study, which utilized interviews conducted by the Capital 
Jury Project of people who served as jurors in capital cases, compared ju-
rors who served on adult cases with those who served on cases involving 
juveniles.316 The study determined that the crimes of juvenile and adult cap-
ital defendants differed “only slightly in defendant-victim relationships, in 
the numbers of victims and perpetrators, and in jurors’ choice of descriptive 
terms to characterize the killings.”317 Although, “[d]espite the similarity of 
their crimes, defendants in juvenile and adult cases differ vastly in how they 
are described by jurors.”318 “The two most distinctive characterizations of 
the juvenile defendant are his family dysfunction and his social maladjust-
ment.”319 Although the interviews dealt with different defendants and dif-
ferent crimes, juries had similar accounts for why they refused to sentence a 
juvenile offender to death. In particular, “nearly all of these jurors describe 
the juvenile defendant’s overwhelmingly dysfunctional home life and im-
                                                                                                                           
 315 William J. Bowers et al., Too Young for the Death Penalty: An Empirical Examination of 
Community Conscience and the Juvenile Death Penalty from the Perspective of Capital Jurors, 84 
B.U. L. REV. 609, 617–18 (2004). 
 316 Id. at 618. 
 317 Id. at 655. 
 318 Id.  
 319 Id. In particular, “[r]eflecting his adverse family background, jurors affirmed the absence 
of a loving family, the presence of poverty, and their belief that he got a raw deal in life. As indi-
cators of social maladjustment, they identified his inability to know his place in society and lack 
of basic human instincts.” Id. The study noted: 
In particular, jurors from these cases describe the defendant as lacking positive role 
models and never being taught social norms of proper behavior. Observing that the 
juvenile offender is in many ways himself a victim, they often describe the defend-
ant as lacking the fundamental social capital to be a law-abiding citizen. They see 
the death penalty as unacceptable in such cases because juvenile defendants cannot 
be held fully responsible for their crimes.  
Id. at 658. The study further noted: 
Jurors blame the defendant’s family and the lack of parental care or supervision as 
reasons for refusing to impose the death sentence. Describing the defendant’s par-
ents as unloving, uncaring, absent, abusive—picturing them as drug addicts, as in-
appropriate themselves in court—many jurors think of the juvenile defendant’s up-
bringing as profoundly lacking in social control and support. Others even see the 
parents’ failure to provide counseling as “proof” of why a young defendant commit-
ted the crime, thus ascribing guilt to them as well as the defendant. Jurors also see 
the defendant’s immaturity as a bar to the death penalty. While an adult defendant’s 
inappropriate behavior in court and failure to show remorse may undermine jurors’ 
receptivity to mitigation, such conduct may have the opposite effect when the de-
fendant is a juvenile. By laughing or showing a lack of respect or seriousness, for 
example, a juvenile defendant may be seen by jurors as “still a kid.” In effect, such 
inappropriate or immature behavior confirms jurors’ suspicions that the juvenile de-
fendant is not fully responsible for his crime and hence that death is not appropriate 
as punishment.  
Id. at 667. 
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maturity as a reason for sparing him the death penalty.”320 Significantly, the 
study found that the possibility of rehabilitation was central to the differ-
ences in thinking by jurors in adult and juvenile cases.321 This study demon-
strates that jurors in capital cases considered many of the factors that Miller 
now requires the sentencer to take into account when determining whether 
to impose life without parole on a juvenile. 
Information can also be gleaned from several empirical studies analyz-
ing mock juror treatment of cases involving juveniles. One set of studies 
considered the effect of a defendant’s age on trial and sentencing out-
comes.322 In the first study, individual mock jurors read a trial transcript and 
were told that the defendant was thirteen, seventeen, or twenty-five years 
old.323 Results showed that although the defendant’s age had no effect on 
the jurors’ decision regarding the defendant’s guilt, the jurors recommended 
shorter sentences for the younger defendants.324 In the second study, jurors 
read the same trial transcript but deliberated as a group. These group ver-
dicts did not differ significantly by age. Age was a factor, however, in the 
deliberations, and the researchers found that “age tended to be used as a 
mitigating factor in favor of youth rather than against them.”325 
                                                                                                                           
 320 Id. at 658.  
 321 Id.at 653. The study found: 
More jurors in juvenile cases (55.3%) than in adult cases (36.4%) said that “the goal 
of rehabilitation” was very or fairly important to them in deciding what the punish-
ment should be. Since rehabilitation and execution are incompatible, the implication 
is that jurors in juvenile cases are much more concerned than those in adult cases 
with preserving the defendant’s life. Consistent with such a concern, jurors in juve-
nile cases also appear to have been moved more than those in adult cases by “feel-
ings of compassion or mercy for the defendant” and by “the belief that the defendant 
should have a chance to pay for the crime and become a law abiding citizen” (differ-
ences of 14.3 and 11.7 percentage points, respectively).  
Id. 
 322 Diane Warling & Michele Peterson-Badali, The Verdict on Jury Trials for Juveniles: The 
Effects of Defendant’s Age on Trial Outcomes, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 63, 63–64 (2003). 
 323 Id. at 67. 
 324 Id. at 78. 
 325 Id. at 64. In another study, subjects read a scenario about a juvenile who committed a 
crime, decided on a sentence, and rated perceptions of the juvenile’s accountability and legal 
competence. The study manipulated the age of the defendant (eleven versus fourteen versus seven-
teen years), type of crime (shooting versus arson), crime outcome (victim injured versus died), and 
time delay between the instigating incident and the crime (immediately versus one day). The re-
searchers concluded that “[t]he type and outcome of the crime were major motivating factors in 
sentencing decisions and perceptions of legal competence, and, although younger offenders were 
seen as less accountable and less competent than older offenders, sentence allocation and attitudes 
towards punishment were not significantly affected by offender age.” Simona Ghetti & Allison D. 
Redlich, Reactions to Youth Crime: Perceptions of Accountability and Competency, 19 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 33, 33 (2001). The authors concluded that there is a tendency to attribute antisocial acts 
to a “criminal disposition” that exists regardless of the offender’s age. Id. at 46. This attribution 
allows individuals to feel some control over events that are incomprehensible and makes them feel 
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The impact of age on decision making by jurors may, however, dimin-
ish as the seriousness of the crime increases. A study considered mock juror 
decision making in cases where juvenile offenders faced the death penalty 
and found a significant age effect for the least heinous crimes evaluated—
i.e., fewer death sentences for younger offenders. As the severity of the 
crime increased, however, the age effect decreased and the study found no 
age effect for the most serious crimes.326 
Not surprisingly, jurors’ preexisting stereotypes about juvenile offenders 
appear to impact evaluation of cases. A study determined that mock jurors 
who endorsed the “superpredator” stereotype of juvenile offenders327 were 
more likely to convict a juvenile murder defendant than those who endorsed 
                                                                                                                           
less personally vulnerable. Id. Notably, however, the study did not compare juveniles to adults, 
but only younger juveniles to older juveniles. 
 326 Finkel et al., Killing Kids: The Juvenile Death Penalty and Community Sentiment, 12 BE-
HAV. SCI. & L. 5, 12–20 (1994); see also R. Kalbeitzer & N. Goldstein, Assessing the “Evolving 
Standards of Decency”: Perceptions of Capital Punishment for Juveniles, 24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 
157, 163 (2006). 
 327 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, at the height of the tough-on-crime era, there was a 
spike in homicides committed by juveniles. Philip J. Cook & John H. Laub, After the Epidemic: 
Recent Trends in Youth Violence in the United States, 29 CRIME & JUST. 1, 15 (2002). The narra-
tive of the “juvenile superpredator” emerged as an explanation for why young children were 
committing homicides and other violent crimes. Juvenile superpredators were simply born bad. 
They were remorseless, lacked a moral conscience, and were incapable of reform. A vocal advo-
cate of the “superpredator” narrative asserted: 
On the horizon . . . are tens of thousands of severely morally impoverished juvenile 
super-predators. They are perfectly capable of committing the most heinous acts of 
physical violence for the most trivial reasons . . . . They fear neither the stigma of ar-
rest nor the pain of imprisonment. They live by the meanest code of the meanest 
streets, a code that reinforces rather than restrains their violent, hair-trigger mentali-
ty. 
John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WEEKLY STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 
23. “Superpredators” were described as: 
[R]adically impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters, including ever more 
preteenage boys, who murder, assault, rape, rob, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, join 
gun-toting gangs, and create serious communal disorders . . . . They perceive hardly 
any relationship between doing right (or wrong) now and being rewarded (or pun-
ished) for it later. To these mean-street youngsters, the words “right” and “wrong” 
have no fixed moral meaning. 
WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA’S 
WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 27 (1996); see Peter Annin, “Superpredators” Arrive: Should 
We Cage the New Breed of Vicious Kids?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1996, at 57; John J. Dilulio, Jr., 
Defining Criminality Up, WALL ST. J., July 3, 1996, at A10; John J. Dilulio, Jr., My Black Crime 
Problem, and Ours, CITY J., Spring 1996, at 5, 14–28; Suzanne Fields, The Super-Predator, 
WASH. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1996, at A23; Gene Koprowski, The Rise of the Teen Super-Predator, 
WASH. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1996, at A17; see also Lara A. Bazelon, Note, Exploding The Superpreda-
tor Myth: Why Infancy Is the Preadolescent’s Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
159, 165 n.21 (2000). 
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the more innocuous stereotype of juveniles as “wayward youths.”328 Another 
study showed that people form negative impressions of juveniles who are 
tried in adult court and view them as even more dangerous and their crimes as 
even more serious than those of adult defendants.329 
Racial bias is of special concern in cases involving juveniles. Robin 
Walker Sterling explains that “implicit biases based on racial stereotypes 
conflate assessments of youth culpability, maturity, sophistication, future 
dangerousness, and severity of punishment.”330 The “superpredator” myth 
of the 1990s focused particularly on the “dangers” of African American 
youth, and racial bias persists today in the treatment of children charged 
with or convicted of crimes. A recent study found that participants who 
were told that a juvenile was black were more likely to choose harsh sen-
tences (including life without parole) then participants who were told that 
the juvenile was white.331 Racial bias is, of course, a major concern with the 
sentencing of juveniles by judges as well.332 
Another consideration with jury sentencing is that the jury selection 
process may disqualify individuals who express unwillingness to impose 
life-without-parole sentences on juveniles in any circumstances. This is a 
major concern in death penalty cases, where juries are “death qualified.”333 
The result of the process is a jury that may not accurately reflect the senti-
ments of the community.  
Finally, in some cases, defendants may prefer sentencing by judges if 
judges are required to provide statements of reasons supporting their deci-
sions and juries are not. In other words, there may be a better record for ap-
                                                                                                                           
 328 T. Haegerich & B. Bottoms, Effect of Jurors’ Stereotypes of Juvenile Offenders on Pre- 
and Post-deliberation Case Judgments, American Psychology-Law Society Annual Conference 
(Mar. 2004) (on file with author). Individuals completed stereotype measures several months be-
fore participating in an ostensibly unrelated mock murder trial. Id. 
 329 C. Tang et al., Effects of Trial Venue and Pretrial Bias on the Evaluation of Juvenile De-
fendants, 34 CRIM. JUST. REV. 210, 210–25 (2009). 
 330 Robin Walker Sterling, “Children Are Different”: Implicit Bias, Rehabilitation, and the 
“New” Juvenile Jurisprudence, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1019, 1067 (2013). 
 331 Aneeta Rattan et al., Race and the Fragility of the Legal Distinction Between Juveniles 
and Adults, PLOS ONE, 2–4 (May 23, 2012), available at http://web.stanford.edu/~eberhard/
downloads/20120523-RaceAndTheFragility.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ZSS9-4YLB. 
 332 A 2012 study conducted by The Sentencing Project of juvenile offenders serving life-
without-parole sentences nationwide concluded that the races of victims and offenders still “may 
play a key role in determining which offenders are sentenced to juvenile life without parole.” 
ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS: FINDINGS FROM A 
NATIONAL SURVEY 3 (2012). Mandatory life-without-parole sentences would have been the result 
of charging decisions by prosecutors and convictions by juries. Discretionary life-without-parole 
sentences in most instances would have resulted from judicial decisions. 
 333 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (allowing challenges for cause 
over a juror’s views on capital punishment if those views “would prevent or substantially impair 
the performance of his duties”); Note, Live Free and Nullify: Against Purging Capital Juries of 
Death Penalty Opponents, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2092 (2014).  
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peal if a judge sentences. Of course, the presence of a jury may introduce 
other grounds for challenging a life-without-parole sentence on appeal (e.g., 
irregularities in jury selection, improper evidentiary rulings).  
In sum, although existing studies suggest that juries are likely to view 
youth as mitigating, racial bias may prevent juries from giving youth miti-
gating effect in some cases. Moreover, the mitigating effect of age on sen-
tencing decisions by juries may decrease as the severity of the crime in-
creases. It does appear that a juror’s knowledge about the alternative possi-
ble sentences for a juvenile convicted of a serious crime is likely to influ-
ence the decision about whether life without parole is appropriate. 
All and all, it is difficult to predict whether juries or judges will be bet-
ter at fulfilling Miller’s mandate to give youth mitigating effect. The answer 
is no doubt highly dependent on the particular judge, the makeup of the par-
ticular jury, and the characteristics of the individual defendant and offense. 
If a juvenile facing life without parole has a right to jury sentencing, then 
the juvenile (in consultation with counsel) can determine in an individual 
case whether to waive the right and consent to judicial sentencing. It bears 
noting that a prosecutor cannot insist on jury sentencing as a matter of con-
stitutional right, as the right belongs to the accused. The prosecutor may, 
however, have the ability as a matter of state law or rules of court to force 
jury sentencing even if the defendant wishes the judge to sentence. Yet 
prosecutors may be unlikely to insist on jury involvement when defendants 
consent to waive juries—given that involving juries would increase the 
length and the complexity of the proceeding. 
E. “Uncommon” Life-Without-Parole Sentences for Juveniles 
Although it is debatable whether juries are more inclined than judges 
to give mitigating effect to youth, giving juveniles the right to jury sentenc-
ing in serious juvenile cases may nonetheless be the best way to make life-
without-parole sentences for juveniles “uncommon.”334 In particular, giving 
juveniles facing life without parole the right to jury sentencing is likely to 
reduce the frequency of life-without-parole sentences. Placing the sentenc-
ing decision in the hands of a jury would make the proceeding more akin to 
the sentencing phase of a capital trial than to a traditional sentencing hear-
ing in a noncapital case. At the sentencing phase of a capital case, defense 
lawyers typically present extensive mitigating evidence by calling fact wit-
nesses, offering documentary evidence, and presenting expert testimony.335 
                                                                                                                           
 334 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
 335 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Miller v. Alabama: Is Death (Still) Different?, 11 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37, 42–43 (2013). Steiker and Steiker discuss whether Miller’s command of 
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In contrast, the presentations by defense counsel at sentencing hearings in 
noncapital cases—even when a defendant is facing life in prison—have his-
torically been much less comprehensive. They often do not involve the 
presentation of evidence but merely an argument by the lawyer and possibly 
statements from the defendant’s family members asking for leniency.336 In 
many jurisdictions, cases automatically transferred to adult court involving 
juveniles have been treated just like any other noncapital adult case. 
A right to jury sentencing for juveniles facing life without parole 
would distinguish these cases from ordinary noncapital cases and give the 
proceedings a greater prominence. With a jury empaneled, judges are likely 
to allow more time for the presentation of evidence, and defense lawyers 
may more readily recognize the need for a higher level of development of 
mitigating evidence. The presentation of this mitigating evidence is crucial 
in serious cases to make the sentencer view the individual sentenced as hu-
man and capable of redemption.337 With a capital-style presentation of miti-
gating evidence, the sentencer will be more likely to give youth mitigating 
effect as Miller requires. 
Moreover, because a sentencing proceeding before a jury is likely to be 
more time-consuming and work-intensive for all parties, the right to jury 
sentencing for juveniles facing life without parole gives juveniles greater 
leverage in plea negotiations with prosecutors.338 In addition, the process of 
selecting a jury is time-consuming and introduces the potential for reversi-
ble error. Prosecutors may decide that it is simply too time-consuming and 
burdensome to seek life without parole. 
F. Making Miller Meaningful in the States 
States can avoid a host of constitutional challenges to sentences by 
simply eliminating life without parole for all juveniles. Indeed, many states 
                                                                                                                           
individualized sentencing for juveniles facing life without parole demands the same level of de-
fense lawyer practice in these cases as in death penalty cases. Id. at 43–46.  
 336 Id. at 43 (“Capital trials are nothing like their non-capital counterparts, and intensive in-
vestigation and presentation of mitigating evidence are the primary distinguishing features.”). 
 337 See AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN 
CONDITION 167 (2001). Sarat considers the role of death penalty lawyers in presenting mitigating 
evidence. He explains that the death penalty lawyer’s work is “increasingly the work of recording 
the stories of their clients’ lives, of the poverty and abuse that breeds violence, and of the indiffer-
ence of a state intent on doing its own kind of violence.” Id. Sarat asserts that “the one overriding 
strategic goal in all narratives is to humanize the client, under the assumption that jurors and judg-
es will only condemn those whom they see as fundamentally Other, as inhuman, as outside the 
reach of the community of compassionate beings.” Id. at 173. 
 338 Cf. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 335, at 46 (“The costs associated with capital trials—the 
lion’s share of which is directly attributable to the new mitigation practice—have contributed to 
the dramatic decline in death sentences over the past fifteen years. Prosecutors are increasingly 
willing to forego the possibility of a death sentence to avoid the extensive cost of a capital trial.”). 
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have already taken this approach.339 Short of abolishing life without parole 
for juveniles, states can avoid Sixth Amendment challenges to life-without-
parole sentences for juveniles by giving juveniles the right to jury sentenc-
ing. 
Several states already give defendants—juveniles and adults—the right 
to jury findings before they may be sentenced to life without parole. For 
example, in Vermont, a court may sentence a defendant to life without pa-
role for first- or second-degree murder only if a jury first finds that aggra-
vating factors outweigh any mitigating factors.340 Vermont’s current statuto-
ry scheme requiring jury involvement followed a decision by the Vermont 
Supreme Court holding the prior scheme unconstitutional on Sixth Amend-
ment grounds.341 Under the prior version of the statute, life-without-parole 
sentences were authorized only if a court found that the aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigation factors. Rhode Island also requires a jury finding 
of aggravating factors before life without parole may be imposed.342 Once 
the jury has found an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
judge has discretion to impose either life without parole or life with pa-
role.343 
                                                                                                                           
 339 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 340 The Vermont statute provides in relevant part: 
 (b) The punishment for murder in the first degree shall be imprisonment for life 
and for a minimum term of 35 years unless a jury finds that there are aggravating or 
mitigating factors which justify a different minimum term. If the jury finds that the 
aggravating factors outweigh any mitigating factors, the court may set a minimum 
term longer than 35 years, up to and including life without parole. If the jury finds 
that the mitigating factors outweigh any aggravating factors, the court may set a 
minimum term at less than 35 years but not less than 15 years. 
 (c) The punishment for murder in the second degree shall be imprisonment for 
life and for a minimum term of 20 years unless a jury finds that there are aggravat-
ing or mitigating factors which justify a different minimum term. If the jury finds 
that the aggravating factors outweigh any mitigating factors, the court may set a 
minimum term longer than 20 years, up to and including life without parole. If the 
jury finds that the mitigating factors outweigh any aggravating factors, the court 
may set a minimum term at less than 20 years but not less than 10 years. 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2303 (2014). 
 341 State v. Provost, 896 A.2d 55, 64 (Vt. 2005). 
 342 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19.2-1 (2014). 
 343 The Rhode Island statute provides: 
In all cases tried by a jury in which the penalty of life imprisonment without parole 
may be imposed pursuant to § 11-23-2 or 11-23-2.1, and in which the attorney gen-
eral has recommended to the court in writing within twenty (20) days of the date of 
the arraignment that such a sentence be imposed, the court shall, upon return of a 
verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree by the jury, instruct the jury to deter-
mine whether it has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder commit-
ted by the defendant involved one of the circumstances enumerated in § 11-23-2 or 
11-23-2.1 as the basis for imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without pa-
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Both the Vermont and Rhode Island schemes leave the ultimate deci-
sion regarding whether to impose life without parole in the hands of judges, 
rather than the juries that found the defendant eligible for life without pa-
role. It appears such a scheme would satisfy Sixth Amendment concerns. In 
particular, a state could require a jury to find that the juvenile committed a 
“homicide” crime and was “irreparably corrupt,” but leave the ultimate de-
cision about whether to impose life without parole in the hands of a judge.  
Such a structure may have its advantages in some cases. Yet a concern 
with this bifurcated structure is that it may allow the jury to avoid feeling 
ultimate responsibility for the sentence imposed. In most states, juries are 
empowered to make the ultimate decision about whether to impose the 
death penalty.344 Some states, however, leave the ultimate decision in the 
hands of judges and even allow judges to override sentencing recommenda-
tions of juries.345 A study of capital jury decision making in such “hybrid” 
states found: “[T]he punishment decisions of jurors in hybrid states were 
fraught with less seriousness and conscientiousness owing to jurors’ recog-
nition that their punishment decision was not final. Where their sentence 
determination was merely a recommendation, they more often denied re-
sponsibility for the defendant’s punishment, they more often failed to un-
derstand jury instructions, and they devoted less time and effort to deciding 
the sentence.”346 Josh Bowers argues that “an equitable sentencing jury not 
only provides a democratic check on the prosecutor; it forces the jury to 
                                                                                                                           
role. If after deliberation the jury finds that one or more of the enumerated circum-
stances was present, it shall state in writing, signed by the foreperson of the jury, 
which circumstance or circumstances it found beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon re-
turn of an affirmative verdict, the court shall conduct a presentence hearing. At the 
hearing, the court shall permit the attorney general and the defense to present addi-
tional evidence relevant to a determination of the sentence to be imposed as provid-
ed for in § 12-19.2-4. After hearing evidence and argument relating to the presence 
or absence of aggravating and mitigating factors, the court shall, in its discretion, 
sentence the defendant to either life imprisonment without parole or life imprison-
ment. If the trial court is reversed on appeal because of error only in the presentence 
hearing, the new proceedings before the trial court which may be ordered shall per-
tain only to the issue of sentencing. 
Id. 
 344 Woodward, 134 S. Ct. at 407 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that of the thirty-two 
states that currently authorize capital punishment, thirty-one require jury participation in the sen-
tencing decision; in all but four of those states, the jury’s decision to spare the defendant from 
death is final and cannot be overridden by a judge). 
 345 See id.  
 346 William J. Bowers et al., The Decision Maker Matters: An Empirical Examination of the 
Way the Role of the Judge and the Jury Influence Death Penalty Decision-Making, 63 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 931, 1010 (2006). 
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take responsibility for its punishment decision.”347 Thus, there may be a 
benefit, at least in some cases, to requiring jurors to make, and take respon-
sibility for, the decision to sentence a juvenile to die in prison.348 
CONCLUSION 
There has been a great deal of activity in state courts and legislatures 
in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Graham v. Florida and 
Miller v. Alabama. Yet despite the extensive debate in the states, no one has 
asked a crucial question: Can a judge sentence a juvenile to die in prison or 
does a juvenile have a right to have a jury make this determination? Courts 
and state legislatures responding to Miller have assumed that a judge can 
impose life without parole on a juvenile, as long as the judge has discretion 
to impose a less severe sentence. 
Graham and Miller place Eighth Amendment ceilings on punishment 
for juveniles. Under the decisions, it appears that a juvenile may be exposed 
to life without parole only if there are factual findings that he (1) committed 
a “homicide” offense, and (2) is irreparably corrupt. If an Eighth Amend-
ment limit on a sentence operates in the same way as a statutory maximum 
sentence, then the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find the facts beyond 
a reasonable doubt that expose a juvenile to life without parole. 
Although the Constitution, rather than a legislature or commission, sets 
an Eighth Amendment punishment ceiling, it nonetheless defines the lawful 
sentencing range to which a defendant may be exposed. Thus an Eighth 
Amendment ceiling may not be raised under the Sixth Amendment absent 
jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt. With Eighth Amendment limits 
triggering Sixth Amendment rights, a role for the jury in sentencing will be 
preserved—even if legislatures draft statutes in an effort to avoid jury in-
volvement. 
States would do best to simply eliminate life-without-parole sentences 
for juveniles—it is the right thing to do and avoids a host of constitutional chal-
lenges to these sentences. Barring that solution, juveniles in states that retain 
life without parole as a possible sentence can assert their right to jury sentenc-
ing. A right to jury sentencing may help make life-without-parole sentences 
for juveniles “uncommon.” 
                                                                                                                           
 347 Bowers, supra note 292, at 45–46. Bowers urges legislatures to adopt capital-style jury 
sentencing for all cases (adult and juvenile) in which the potential exists for a life-without-parole 
sentence. Id. at 46. 
 348 Justice Breyer’s view is that “the Eighth Amendment requires individual jurors to make, 
and to take responsibility for, a decision to sentence a person to death.” Ring, 536 U.S. at 619 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
   
 
